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Regionalism and regional integration in East Asia has developed dynamically at various 
levels over the past two decades. In the world system, East Asia‘s degree of regional 
economic coherence is second only to the European Union‘s. In addition to deepening 
micro-level regionalisation, new regional frameworks and organisations have emerged, 
centred on an East Asian collective of nations and economies. This paper examines the 
development of  new regional institutions involving the whole East Asia region, focusing 
on four ‗supra-structure institutions‘: ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit, Asia-Europe 
Meeting,  and  Asia-Pacific  Economic  Co-operation  forum;  and  two  ‗supporting 
institutions‘: Pacific Basin Economic Council and Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. 
Particular attention is made to what likely future regional institutional architecture centred 
on East Asia may emerge over forthcoming years, and the following core arguments are 
made. Owing to issues of ‗variable geography‘, the constituent membership of an East 
Asian  region  is  open  to  contestation  and  East  Asia‘s  patterns  of  regional  economic 
coherence are to some extent in a constant state of flux. The formation of an East Asian 
regional community will also depend on an alignment of national interests, development-
related  imperatives  and  ideological  factors,  and  primacy  will  come  to  the  regional 
institution  that  develops  the  most  effective  instruments  of  regional  co-operation  and 
integration. The paper argues that this will probably be ASEAN Plus Three, which has 
the most realistic prospects of advancing regional economic integration. Each regional 
institution should functionally specialise, the larger grouping of EAS, ASEM and APEC 
concentrating  for  example  on  developing  their  multilateral  utility  regarding  global 
governance issues. Finally, fostering a more functionally effective partnership between 
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1.   Introduction: The East Asia Region, Vision and Aspiration 
 
1.1   Idea of the East Asia Region 
 
For some time, references to an East Asia region have competed with various other 
alternative terms that refer to the eastern part of the Asian continent—the Far East, the 
Pacific Rim, and simply Asia. Increasingly though, East Asia has become the convention 
for  generally  referring  to  a  grouping  of  Southeast  and  Northeast  Asian  countries  or 
economies, normally thought of as comprising 
 
  Southeast  Asia—Brunei  Darussalam,  Cambodia,  Democratic  Republic  of  Timor-
Leste,  Indonesia,  Lao  People‘s  Democratic  Republic  (Lao  PDR),  Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
  Northeast  Asia—Japan;  People‘s  Republic  of  China  (PRC);  Republic  of  Korea 
(henceforth Korea); Democratic People‘s Republic of  Korea (DPRK);  Hong Kong,  
China; Macau, China; Mongolia; and Taipei,China. 
 
Regionalized  economic  ties  amongst  East  Asian  countries  have  deepened  since  the 
1960s, and it is this growing economic coherence that arguably more than anything else 
explains why East Asia is referred to as a distinct regional entity. Only Europe has a 
more developed level of regional economic interdependence and cohesion than East 
Asia in the international system. The main sources of this cohesion may be summarized 
as follows: 
 
  Deepening micro-level economic regionalization resulting from the development 
of  functionally  integrated  region-wide  systems  of  business  and  infrastructural 
linkages  (e.g.,  regional  production  networks)  and  regionalizing  social  relations. 
Japan‘s ‗flying geese‘ model of regionalized economic development is often cited as 
a  key  initial  catalyst  of  this  process  in  which  Japan‘s  multinational  enterprises 
(MNEs)  constructed  production  plants  across  the  region,  linked  together  to  other 
plants,  both  back  in  Japan  and  elsewhere  thus  creating  regionalized  business 
systems (Akamatsu 1935, Kojima 1977, Peng 2000, Tsui-Auch 1999, Furuoka 2005). 
This  was  later  augmented  by  the  regional  transnational  operations  of  investing 
European and American MNEs.  
  East Asia’s economic miracle, which is usually thought of as based on the region‘s 
generic  development  model—centered  on  the  developmental  state  paradigm  of 
state-business partnered capitalism and export-oriented industrialization—that could 
be in some way contrasted with Western counterparts (World Bank 1993). Closely 
related to this was how most East  Asian  countries have experienced  a profound 
economic transformation in recent decades, albeit to varying levels of significance. 
  End  of  the  Cold  War,  which  created  more  favorable  geopolitical  conditions  for 
closer economic relationships to develop in the region. 
  Growing  macro-level  regional  co-operation  after  the  1997/98  Asian  financial 
crisis, whereby East Asian governments have substantively increased their levels of  
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co-operation within the region on financial, monetary, trade, investment, and other 
economic affairs in an attempt to avoid another such regional crisis. 
Various integrative forces continue to bind the region together at the economic, political, 
social, and other levels. These processes were also constituent to wider global-scale 
integrative developments, such as globalization. Furthermore, East Asia continues to 
have a growing impact on the international economic system, its ascendance having 
broadly restructured this system as something between a dominant tripolar (East Asia, 
Europe, North America) and multipolar (G8 powers and the BRICs
1) structure. 
 
1.2   What is East Asia? Issues of Regional Membership and Variable 
Geography 
 
There will always be debates over which countries or societies belong to which particular 
regional  groupings.  Different  international  or  regional  organizations  will  often  assign 
countries  to  different  regions,  but  such  classifications  may  of  course  vary  from  one 
organization to another. Like most other regions, definitions regarding what constitutes 
the  East  Asia  region  are  subject  to  the  principle  of  variable  geography.  Just  as  the 
concept of variable geometry explains how member states may enter into differentiated 
levels  and  arrangements  of  regional  co-operation  and  integration,  such  as  the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the implementation of the ASEAN 
Free  Trade  Area  (AFTA),  so  the  concept  of  variable  geography  applies  where 
differentiated  conceptions  of  which  countries  may  or  may  not  qualify  for  regional 
membership  can  co-exist.  In  other  words,  the  geographic  boundaries  of  regions  are 
ultimately contestable. This explains why Japan‘s current vision of East Asia, which also 
includes India, Australia, and New Zealand, may vie with the PRC‘s more conventional 
view of the region, which includes only the economies of Northeast and Southeast Asia 
listed above. All regions are in some way socio-culturally or socio-politically constructed, 
whereby peoples from different nations within a defined geographic space commonly 
associate around a shared sense of region (Hettne 2005, Katzenstein 2000). A region‘s 
geographic definition is therefore open to interpretation and contestation, albeit within 
the bounds of basic geographic logic. Thus, one could make a case for India‘s eligibility 
for East Asia‘s regional membership but not Brazil‘s.  
 
Determining  specific  regional  memberships  depends  largely  on  the  fundaments  that 
have shaped our understanding of regions as coherent entities. As it was argued at the 
start of this paper that economic factors were the most important fundaments in East 
Asia‘s case, rather than social, cultural, or geopolitical factors—it would follow that if 
geographically proximate countries (e.g. India, Australia) became increasing integral to 
the core East Asia regional economy then this would strengthen their claim for regional 
membership. Countries such as India and Pakistan (in recent times mostly considered 
as core elements of South Asia) could also claim closer socio-cultural linkages with a 
number of Southeast Asian countries than could Japan or Korea. Generally speaking, an 
important aspect of the variable geography principle is that the map of economic, social, 
cultural and geopolitical linkages that underpin regional coherence is constantly shifting, 
and that the natural state of these linkages is one of flux. Thus, present conventional 
                                                           
1 The collective term for a group of rising powers: Brazil, Russia, India, and the PRC.  
Organizing the Wider East Asia Region   |       3 
 
definitions of East Asia may look very different to those that prevail in 10, 20, or 30 years 
time, if indeed we are still talking about East Asia rather than another newly formulated 
regional concept. 
 
Debates over country eligibility for East Asia regional membership have intensified of 
late, especially  with respect to the East Asia Summit group. Geographic logic would 
dictate that the Russian Far East and Mongolia should be de facto included in any East 
Asian grouping, yet their hitherto marginal engagement in East Asia‘s regional economic 
dynamic and integration processes had mitigated such an inclusion. Many scholars and 
other analysts continue to refer to East Asia consisting of essentially Northeast Asian 
countries,  thus  disqualifying  Southeast  Asian  countries.  Furthermore,  the  distinction 
between East Asia and Asia has been increasingly used to specify where exactly on the 
vast  continent  the  aforementioned  profound  economic  transformation  was  actually 
occurring on a specific regional (rather than continental) scale.  
 
At present, then, the definitional boundaries of East Asia are being pulled in different 
directions.  In  a  geopolitical  sense,  Japan  in  particular  has  strongly  advocated  the 
inclusion  of  India  and  Oceania  (Australia  and  New  Zealand),  and  associated 
membership being conferred to the United States (US) in order to counterbalance the 
rising power of the PRC. From an economic perspective, India has become increasingly 
integral to the regionalized dynamics of the East Asian economy, as is evident in both 
micro-level regionalization (e.g. international production network trade and investment 
linkages) and macro-level regionalism (e.g., signed international economic agreements 
with ASEAN, the PRC, Japan and Korea. These points are discussed in further detail 
later. 
 
1.3   Towards Visions of an East Asian Regional Community 
 
1.3.1   The 1950s to 1980s 
 
The  global  geopolitics  of  the  Cold  War  was  marked  by  divisions,  with  East  Asian 
countries  mostly  split  along  capitalist-  and  communist-oriented  alignments.  However, 
Indonesia‘s hosting of the 1955 Bandung Conference cut across this geopolitical divide 
by bringing together a collective of 29 mostly developing countries from Asia and Africa 
to discuss common development-related issues. This was the first time that leaders from 
East Asian countries had convened together after the Second World War, albeit with 
those from another region, to deliberate over shared economic, political, and cultural 
interests. The Asian countries present comprised Cambodia, the PRC, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam (including representatives from what was then known as the Republic of Viet 
Nam). Conference members signed a Declaration on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
Existence based on a prior understanding established between the PRC and India a 
year  earlier.  The  declaration  emphasized  respect  for  national  sovereignty,  non-
interference in the internal affairs of other nations, economic and technical co-operation, 
mutual benefit, the needs and rights of developing nations (including investment and the 
stabilization of primary product prices), and peaceful co-existence. As Mawdsley (2007) 
observed, this reflected the delegate countries‘ preferred vision for a multipolar world  
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order, and for moving beyond ―European colonialism and US–USSR neo-imperialistic 
superpower rivalry.‖ 
 
Notwithstanding the historic significance of the 1955 Bandung Conference, it did little to 
foster regional level cohesion amongst East Asian states, or lay out a vision for East 
Asian  regional  community  building.  Geopolitical  divisions  and  conflict  still  largely 
characterized diplomatic relations between most countries in the region. Moreover, by 
the 1960s, the region‘s emerging economic superpower, Japan, was more interested in 
promoting a Pacific community concept rather than an East Asian one. In 1965, the 
Japan Economic Research Center (JERC)—a government sponsored think tank—put 
forward a proposal for creating a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) comprising the Asia–
Pacific‘s five advanced economies: Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
(JERC 1966). The lynchpin of this trade alliance was Japan‘s security relationship with 
the US, which oriented most aspects of Japanese foreign policy. In the PAFTA proposal, 
Asia–Pacific  developing  countries  in  the  region  would  be  conferred  associative 
membership  with  a  view  to  eventually  graduating  to  full  membership  after  meeting 
certain economic criteria. Japan‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored consultations on 
the PAFTA idea with other Asia–Pacific countries over the next few years, creating new 
dialogue networks on trade-related issues in the process (Kojima 1971, Korhonen 1994, 
Ravenhill 2001).  
 
Although PAFTA never materialized, it created the momentum for elite network building 
between leading Asia–Pacific nations. Australia and Japan formed the key partnership 
that led this process, subsequently helping create Asia–Pacific regional organizations in 
which  East  Asian  countries  formed  the  majority  membership  (Morrison  2007).  The 
Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) was the first of these to be established in 1967, 
and was based on an existing Japan–Australia private sector forum that was initially 
extended to include other PAFTA-based representations from the US, New Zealand, and 
Canada. Its main function is to bring together business and economic leaders to forge 
closer  commercial  relationships  across  the  Asia–Pacific.  The  Pacific  Trade  and 
Development (PAFTAD) conference was established soon afterwards in 1968, and since 
then has organized regular meetings between academics to discuss trade, development, 
and other economic policy issues relevant to the Asia–Pacific region. Its conferences 
have  provided  an  important  framework  for  early  technical  discussions  on  enhancing 
regional economic co-operation, including how a PAFTA could potentially be realized. 
These  two  organizations  were  later  joined  by  the  Pacific  Economic  Co-operation 
Conference (PECC),
2 which was created in 1980 to bring together key representatives 
from business, government, and academia to discuss the economic challenges facing 
Asia–Pacific  nations.  During  the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  PAFTAD–PBEC–PECC 
framework  facilitated  various  levels  of  trans-regional  dialogue  on  strengthening 
economic and business ties within the Asia–Pacific, culminating in the establishment of 
the Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum in 1989. The inaugural APEC 
summit was hosted by Australia in Canberra but substantially financed by Japan. As we 
later  discuss,  APEC  showed  much  promise  during  the  early  1990s  for  creating  the 
conditions for East Asian countries to participate in an Asia–Pacific community building 
process. 
                                                           
2 The word Conference was later replaced by Council.  
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In the meantime, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 
1967.  The  five  original  members  comprised  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines, 
Singapore,  and  Thailand.  The  US  had  a  conspicuous  hand  in  helping  establish  the 
organization,  motivated  by  its  interest  in  having  a  group  of  ideologically  compatible 
regimes  in  Southeast  Asia  coalesce  to  act  as  a  bulwark  against  further  communist 
advance in the region (Sum 1996, Yahuda 1996). The formation of ASEAN could also be 
construed as a reconciliation process between certain Southeast Asian countries whose 
relations had been marred by a series of territorial and sovereignty disputes during the 
early  post-independence  period.  For  some  time,  ASEAN  remained  East  Asia‘s  only 
major regional organization or grouping whose membership was exclusively East Asian. 
We discuss later how this special position and continuity have provided an important 
diplomatic  and  institutional  platform  on  which  larger-scale  East  Asian  groupings 
(especially the ASEAN Plus Three [APT] framework) were able to build beginning in the 
mid-1990s. During the 1970s and 1980s however, ASEAN achieved relatively little in 
terms of advancing a vision for an East Asian community. Its member states adhered 
strongly to the organization‘s cardinal principle of non-interference in the affairs of other 
members,  each  proving  generally  reluctant  to  pool  their  sovereignty  in  co-operative 
regional ventures.  
 
In  sum,  by  the  end  of  the  1980s,  while  East  Asia  was  becoming  a  more  coherent 
regional  economy  as  micro-level  linkages  strengthened,  there  had  been  a  negligible 
advancement of ideas pertaining specifically to regional community building. It remained 
a  region  largely  fractured  geopolitically  by  the  prevalence  of  mistrust,  conflict,  and 
stunted diplomatic relations. There were, for example, only very few and relatively minor 
international economic agreements that had been signed amongst East Asian states at 
this time. Moreover, the main regional and other international alignments of these states 
lay outside the region, whether with particular security partner states (e.g. Japan and 
Korea with the US), trans-regional groupings (e.g., APEC), or in a global multilateral 
sense (e.g., Japan and the G7 and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); 
East Asia‘s developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement). This was to change 
in the 1990s, particularly in the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
 
1.3.2   The 1990s and 2000s 
 
In  the  early  1990s,  Malaysian  Prime  Minister  Mahathir  Mohammad—arguably  the 
leading advocate of East Asian regional community building in his time—proposed the 
creation of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) that would exclusively comprise 
East Asian states. Mahathir contended that this would bring geopolitical and integrational 
balance  to  an  emerging  post-Cold War  world  in  which  Europe  was  implementing  its 
single  market  and  the  US  was  moving  closer  to  its  regional  partners  in  the  North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Moreover, Mahathir suggested the EAEG 
would be a vehicle for championing East Asian interests on the global stage, and that 
this  could  not  be  as  effectively  achieved  through  APEC  or  any  other  organizational 
arrangement that included non-East Asian great powers such as the US. In addition, 
Mahathir was a key champion of so-called ―Asian values‖—group ethics, strong family 
and  community  ties,  high  kudos  afforded  to  education  and  public  service,  social 
harmony—which  he  argued  would  serve  as  an  important  social  and  political  binding 
force among the East Asian nations that decided to embark on an EAEG venture.  
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Malaysia‘s original EAEG blueprint was launched in December 1990, containing plans to 
form a preferential trading arrangement among East Asian countries. However, owing to 
US opposition to the proposal, as well as a circumspect response from most other East 
Asian states, Malaysia reformulated their EAEG plan into a more informal East Asian 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) arrangement, and presented this idea at the October 1991 
ASEAN  Economic  Ministers  Meeting.
3  The  EAEC  was  conceived  as  a  dialogue 
mechanism for discussing matters of international economic matters affecting the East 
Asian region, but its essential purpose was the same as the EAEG‘s: to offer some kind 
of vision or starting point for building a harmonious and integrated East Asian regional 
community.  Despite  Malaysia‘s  efforts  at  tempering  its  original  proposal, Washington 
again criticized the plan and applied diplomatic pressure on other East Asian states to 
reject it.
4 Amongst other things, the US was especially concerned that the EAEC would 
undermine APEC–led endeavors at the time of fostering closer trans-Pacific ties.  
 
Although  the  Malaysian  government  made  subsequent  attempts  to  revive  the  EAEC 
proposal, it never materialized. It had nevertheless at least planted the idea of creating 
an exclusive East Asian regional community more firmly in the consciousness of the 
region‘s  leaders  and  opinion-makers.  Under  Mahathir‘s  premiership  (1981–2003), 
Malaysia  remained  a  staunch  advocate  of  an  East  Asian  Community.  In  2002,  it 
proposed the creation of  an ASEAN Plus Three (APT)  Secretariat, although this too 
failed to receive enough support from other group members. In August 2003, Malaysia 
also  organized  the  First  East  Asia  Congress,  bringing  together  delegates  from  APT 
countries.  Playing  host,  Prime  Minister  Mahathir‘s  opening  address  was  entitled 
―Building The East Asian Community: The Way Forward,‖ in which he pointed out that 
the  idea  of  East  Asian  regional  co-operation  and  community  building  was  no  longer 
viewed with the same degree of disdain as before. 
 
The thawing of the Cold War and parallel developments in globalization created more 
favorable  conditions  for  both  regionalism  and  inter-regionalism  to  flourish.  Inter-
regionalism concerns the establishment of relations between relatively distant regional 
groups of countries. This may  be contrasted to trans-regionalism, which relates  to a 
situation where adjacent or proximate regions form a larger regional entity or group (e.g., 
East  Asia,  Oceania,  Pacific  America,  and  the  Asia–Pacific  coming  together  to  form 
APEC).  In  1994,  Singapore—arguably  East  Asia‘s  most  globally  oriented  state—
proposed an inter-regional link with the European Union (EU). The consequent formation 
of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework in 1996 was an important development 
in East Asian regional community building because it further defined its constituent East 
Asian members as a regional group. ASEM‘s original Asian members were all from East 
                                                           
3 Some years later, Mahathir (2006) remarked, ―for reasons we could not understand, the US objected 
strongly to the EAEG. James Baker, who was then the US Secretary of State, visited Korea and Japan 
and told them to have nothing to do with the proposal. Certain ASEAN countries were also advised not 
to support EAEG. It would seem in the US view that while European countries could get together, and 
Canada, the US and Mexico could form NAFTA, East Asian countries were not even allowed to talk to 
each other.‖ 
4  For  example,  when  Korean  Foreign  Minister  Lee  Sang  Ok  suggested  that  his  government  might 
support the EAEC, then US Secretary of State James Baker reminded him that ―it was Americans, not 
Malaysians, who had shed their blood for Korea forty years before,‖ and that ―all countries are not 
equal‖ (Baker 1995).  
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Asia—the  PRC,  Japan,  Korea,  Brunei  Darussalam,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam—but the term ―Asia‖ was chosen in the inter-regional 
framework title to present an opportunity to enlarge ASEM‘s membership. In preparation 
for the inaugural summit, economic ministers from the region‘s 10 participating states 
assembled  for  an  informal  meeting  in  November  1995  to  discuss  planned  common 
agenda  issues.  A  similar  foreign  ministers  meeting  and  another  economic  ministers 
meeting followed in February 1996. Whereas with APEC, East Asia‘s regional identity is 
bound up in a wider Asia–Pacific trans-regional identity formation process, with ASEM, 
East Asian countries were coalescing as a separate and more distinct regional group. Or 
as Gilson (2002) explained it, that is ―we East Asians are meeting with you Europeans‖; 
or as Japan‘s Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa commented, ―these talks with Europe 
are helping us build up our own Asian identity.‖
5 
 
Furthermore, preparatory ASEM consultations amongst its East Asian member states 
led  to  a  common  expressed  interest  in  establishing  regularized  summits  between 
ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries, leading to the first ASEAN ‗Plus‘ summits in 
December  1997—ASEAN  Plus  One  meetings  with  Japan,  the  PRC,  and  Korea 
separately, and then a combined APT meeting. As we later discuss, the APT regional 
framework has made considerable contributions to regional community building in East 
Asia,  at  first  through  its  various  initiatives  to  address  the  1997/98  financial  crisis. 
Divisions  amongst  APEC  member  states  on  how  best  to  tackle  crisis-related  issues 
(e.g., trade and investment), and ASEAN‘s apparent incapacity to cope with the fallout 
from the crisis provided the APT with an opportunity to take the lead. New APT-led 
schemes  to  improve  regional  financial  governance  in  East  Asia—most  notably  the 
Chiang  Mai  Initiative  and  Asian  Bond  Market  Initiative—broke  new  ground  in 
institutionalized  co-operation  amongst  the  region‘s  states,  subsequently  helping  to 
expand APT‘s agenda to cover other key areas of regional affairs, such as energy and 
food security, into the 2000s. As a result, over the past decade East Asian countries 
have generally placed more faith in the APT process rather than APEC with respect to 
regional  co-operation.  APEC  has  never  really  recovered  after  the  debacles  of  the 
1997/98  crisis  period.  Its  centerpiece  project,  the  Bogor  Goals  of  creating  non-
discriminatory free trade and investment relations in the trans-region by 2020, has been 
subverted  by  a  proliferation  of  discriminatory  bilateral  free  trade  agreements  (FTAs) 
(Dent 2006, Okamoto 2003, Ravenhill 2003). 
 
This paper examines regional institutionalized developments involving the whole East 
Asia region. Six region-based frameworks and organizations will be examined, four of 
these  being  supra-structure  institutions—APT,  East  Asia  Summit  (EAS),  ASEM,  and 








                                                           
5 Financial Times, 16 January 2001.  
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2.   ASEAN Plus Three (APT)  
 
2.1   Origins and Early Development 
It was noted earlier how APT came about due to a combination of two related factors. 
The first was the decision of the original Asian ASEM member states to meet together 
prior to facing their EU partners at the Second ASEM meeting held in London in April 
1998. This was the first time that government officials from East Asian countries had met 
exclusively to discuss regional economic and other affairs. The process demonstrated 
that East Asia had much to gain from regularly continuing such meetings and led to the 
idea of raising them to summit level arrangements soon thereafter. The inaugural APT 
summit was held in December 1997 and was hosted by the Malaysian government in 
Kuala Lumpur. The states in attendance comprised the 10 members of ASEAN plus the 
three Northeast Asian states of the PRC, Japan and Korea. This was of some historic 
importance as it was the first time the leaders of most East Asian countries had met 
together as an exclusive regional grouping (Stubbs 2002, Tanaka 2007, Terada 2003). 
In this sense, it was a realization of Mahathir Mohammed‘s vision for creating an EAEG–
EAEC  grouping.  However,  the  APT  was  really  an  extension  of  ASEAN  regional 
diplomacy and co-existed with separate ASEAN Plus One summits between ASEAN and 
individual  Northeast  Asian  country  partners,  which  in  turn  were  convened  right  after 
ASEAN‘s  own  exclusive  summit  meeting.  Thus,  APT  was  part  of  a  nested  summit 
structure, rather than existing as a strictly independent regional arrangement.   
 
Moreover, APT, and also the EAS, may be considered a regional framework rather than 
a regional organization such as ASEAN or APEC (Dent 2008a). All four organizations 
perform  the  following  regional-level  functions:  (i)  regularized  meetings  of  political 
leaders, ministers, other government officials, business leaders, and civil society groups; 
(ii)  co-operative  and  integrative  activities  and  programs;  (iii)  improved  socialization 
amongst participating agents in these meetings, activities, and programs; and (iv) the 
capacity for envisioning and strategizing future possible paths of regional community 
building. However, not only do ASEAN and APEC have more developed and formalized 
structures, in addition they also possess the following: (v) a secretariat, which although 
small in both cases nevertheless operate as a permanent coordinating agency for the 
organizations‘ activities; (vi) the features of a defined organizational identity (e.g., logo, 
website); and (vii) in ASEAN‘s case, an increasing capacity for unitary actions as an 
organization interacting with other  regional organizations (e.g., the EU), countries,  or 
other types of international partners. Both APT and EAS lack such attributes, and are 
essentially summit-driven diplomacy frameworks that facilitate regional co-operation and 
community building. 
 
Notwithstanding  these  institutional  limitations,  APT  has  achieved  some  remarkable 
successes, especially on regional financial co-operation and governance. The 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis peaked at the time of the inaugural APT summit held in late 1997, 
so  inevitably  its  initial  agenda  was  dominated  by  crisis-related  issues.  This  state  of 
affairs persisted for many years thereafter, while the 2008/09 global financial crisis re-
affirmed the importance of continuing to work together at the regional level on economic 
issues. APT‘s key achievements have been the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative  
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(CMI) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI). APT has also gradually broadened 
its agenda to encompass other matters of regional affairs. 
 
2.2   Issue Coverage, Agenda Setting, and Instrumentalization 
 
2.2.1   Towards Strengthening East Asia’s Financial Co-operation and 
Integration 
 
Addressing the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis provided a critically important impetus to 
APT from the start. As is now well documented, the crisis was triggered by Thailand‘s 
decision to de-peg its currency from the US dollar in early July 1997. The ensuing mass 
selling of the Thai baht by currency speculators precipitated a general loss of confidence 
in other Southeast Asian currencies. The currency crisis thereafter spread across the 
wider East Asian region, and deepened into a full-blown financial East Asian economies. 
This  chain  of  events  exposed  both  the  extent  of  regional  financial  market 
interdependence  and  also  the  relative  weakness  of  existing  regional  co-operative 
mechanisms to deal with a crisis of this scale. 
 
Japan  initially  led  the  way  in  proposing  a  regional-wide  rescue  package,  the  Asian 
Monetary  Fund  (AMF)  that  was  proposed  in  September  1997  and  conceived  as  a 
standby fund of US$100 billion to offer emergency financial assistance to East Asian 
countries whose currencies were subject to disruptive speculative pressures. The AMF 
was intended to operate on the pooled foreign exchange reserves of Japan; the PRC; 
Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China; with Japan making the majority 
contribution. Japan felt partly culpable for  the crisis as many of its banks had made 
substantial  levels  of  bad  loans  that  had  contributed  to  the  region‘s  financial  market 
problems.  As  the  region‘s  pre-eminent  financial  power,  Japan  also  felt  the  onus  of 
perceived or actual expectations from other East Asian countries to provide some kind of 
solution to the crisis. Its push behind the AMF proposal could also be construed as a test 
of  its  regional  leadership.  At  the  time,  it  was  the  most  important  regional  economic 
initiative that Japan had ever made.  
 
However, as with Malaysia‘s EAEC and EAEG proposals before it, the US was opposed 
to  the  AMF  proposal,  not  just  because  of  concern  over  being  sidelined  by  such  an 
important and exclusively East Asian regional initiative, but also due to how the AMF 
could potentially undermine the multilateral competence of the IMF, and hence weaken 
American structural power and influence over the international financial system (Higgott 
1998, Rapkin 2001). Tokyo‘s counter-argument that the AMF would be a new facility to 
provide additional resources to supplement those of the IMF did nothing to persuade 
Washington to  shift  its position.  The  PRC  was  also  concerned  over  Japan‘s  idea  to 
involve  Taipei,China,  which  was  then  the  world‘s  third-largest  retainer  of  foreign 
exchange reserves and home to one of Asia‘s most robust central banks, as Beijing 
expressed  reservations  with  any  initiative  that  conferred  international  status  to 
Taipei,China.  The  PRC  government  was  additionally  circumspect  over  Japan‘s 
perceived hegemonic maneuvering within the East Asian regional political economy.  
 
As a result of this opposition, Japan‘s AMF proposal was aborted by November 1997. 
Soon  thereafter  work  commenced  on  a  scaled-down  alternative  proposal,  the  New  
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Miyazawa Initiative (NMI), named after Japan‘s Finance Minister, which was launched in 
October 1998. One of the key architects of the new plan was Japanese Vice Minister for 
Finance, Haruhiko Kuroda, who later became President of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). The NMI was based on a US$30 billion liquidity fund that could be offered to 
other  East  Asian  countries  on  a  bilateral  basis.  Half  of  this  fund  was  dedicated  to 
guaranteeing any government bonds issued by crisis-afflicted countries, and the other 
half was allocated to financing bilateral currency swap agreements with interested APT 
members. In simple terms, currency swaps are agreements between signatory parties to 
exchange one currency for another and to reverse the transaction at some later date; the 
idea being that Japan would swap its foreign exchange reserves (mainly held in US 
dollars) for local currencies that were under pressure in an attempt to avert a run on the 
swap partner‘s currency. 
 
The NMI was later to provide the basis for APT‘s first substantive scheme on regional 
financial co-operation and governance, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Malaysia and 
Korea accepted Japan‘s invitation to become NMI parties, signing US$2.5 billion and 
US$5.0 billion  swap  agreements,  respectively.  These  were  progressively  upgraded 
under the CMI. In addition, the NMI included a US$3.0 billion Asian Currency Crisis 
Support  Facility—administered  through  the  ADB—to  help  APT  countries  raise  funds 
through guarantees, interest subsidies, and other means.
6 The perceived failures and 
inadequacies of the IMF in dealing with the 1997/98 financial crisis, and arguably the 
US‘s own rather indifferent attitude towards East Asia‘s problems at the time, made APT 
nations more receptive to the NMI‘s aims and objectives when discussed at the Second 
APT Summit held in December 1998. Here, Japan tabled a proposal for an additional 
US$5.0 billion  Special  Yen  Loan  Facility  offering  low  interest,  long-term  loans  for 
infrastructure development projects in crisis-afflicted economies. At this summit, East 
Asia‘s leaders, working under the ASEAN-based Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA), agreed to 
develop new methods for  improving regional financial stability (Mahani 2002, Ruland 
2000). The HPA was a broad regional recovery plan that connected ASEAN efforts to 
the wider East Asian community through a variety of trade-, finance-, and development-
related measures. This was one of the first instances where ASEAN initiatives dovetailed 
with the APT framework. Also at the Second APT Summit, member states endorsed the 
PRC‘s proposal for regularized APT finance meetings at the vice-ministerial level, which 
came into effect in March 1999. This was upgraded to full ministerial level the following 
year at Chiang Mai. With the full extent and deep impact of the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis  more  clearly  understood  by  this  time,  APT  members  developed  a  more  firm 
appreciation  of  the  APT  as  a  regional  co-operation  mechanism.  Hereafter,  APT 
diplomacy began to gather momentum.  
 
Japan‘s early leadership on financial co-operation through the AMF and NMI help lay an 
important  foundation  for  APT-based  schemes  and  agreements,  and  helped  firmly 
establish  regional  co-operation  on  finance  as  the  priority  issue  on  the  APT  agenda 
(Hayashi 2006, Henning 2002, Hughes 2000, Katada 2002). Although this agenda was to 
expand to embrace a range of regional affairs—as will be later examined—the APT‘s 
                                                           
6 In addition, the NMI framework included a US$1.1 billion Trade Insurance Facility (offered to Malaysia 
and Thailand) and US$1.2 billion of trade credit guarantees (offered by the Export–Import Bank of 
Japan to the Philippines and Malaysia).  
Organizing the Wider East Asia Region   |       11 
 
main  institutional  and  diplomatic  efforts  were  focused  on  strengthening  East  Asia‘s 
regional financial governance. 
 
2.2.2   The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 
 
The CMI was essentially an extension of the NMI, establishing a region-wide network of 
bilateral currency swap agreements (BCSAs) amongst most APT member states. The 
CMI‘s name derived from the location of the first APT Finance Ministers Meeting held in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand in May 2000. At this meeting, East Asian countries decided to 
raise their level of financial co-operation, with a view to creating new mechanisms to 
counter any future financial crisis arising in the region. An important factor here was the 
widely held view amongst East Asia‘s policy elites that the IMF had failed the region on 
many accounts, and some level of regional self-reliance was required, especially as East 
Asia possessed the world‘s largest financial reserves (Bird and Rajan 2002, Rana 2002).  
 
The  number  of  BCSAs  gradually  grew  so  that  by  May  2003  a  total  of  14  bilateral 
agreements had either been signed or concluded. These were joined by a revamped 
ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA) facility, the lending facility of which was boosted from 
US$200  million  to  US$1.0 billion  as  part  of  the  CMI.  By  this  time,  the  CMI  system 
consisted of agreements that amounted to a total of US$36.0 billion committed funds. At 
the  Eighth  APT  Finance  Ministers  Meeting  held  in  May  2005,  APT  member  states 
agreed to (i) double the total funds committed to the CMI, then standing at US$39.5 
billion; (ii) improve the integration of the scheme‘s surveillance mechanisms, and (iii) 
adopt  a  collective  decision-making  process  on CMI  operations  (Hamilton-Hart  2007). 
(The month before the ASA fund had been increased to US$2.0 billion.) This objective 
was achieved by May 2007 when the CMI system combined 16 agreements
7 amounting 
to US$82.5 billion. By February 2009, this figure had risen to US$93.0 billion (Figure 1). 
 
The creation of the CMI was in many ways playing to East Asia‘s most fundamental 
economic strengths. At the CMI‘s inception, the region possessed around 60% –70% of 
the world‘s foreign exchange reserves (forex), the funds on which the system‘s BCSAs 
were ultimately derived from. Forex is essentially the foreign currency deposits held by 
central banks and other monetary authorities, with the main reserve currencies being the 
US dollar, euro, and yen. Governments may use these reserves to help stabilize the 
country‘s exchange rate by intervening in the currency markets; for  example,  buying 
their  own  currency  with  foreign  reserves  to  counter  downward  pressures  caused  by 
mass selling of the local currency by speculators. The amount of forex committed to the 
CMI could from one perspective be interpreted as less than ambitious, given the levels 
of reserves that APT countries had accumulated after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
Table 1 shows that by the end of 2008 these reserves stood at over US$3,822 billion (up 
from  US$620  billion  in  1997),  or  around  one  half  of  the  global  total. Thus,  the  CMI 
system at this time operated on a mere fraction (just over 2%) of the combined forex of 
APT  states.  This  cautious  approach  extended  to  their  compliance  to  strict  IMF 
                                                           
7 Some of these CMI agreements evolved from one-way ―donor–recipient‖ arrangements into two-way 
arrangements, whereby each BCSA partner offers to assist the other. Examples include the revised 
Japan–Korea agreement, in which Japan will swap up to US$13 billion for Korean won and Korea will 
swap  up  to  US$8 billion  for  Japanese  yen  in  the  event  of  a  crisis,  and  the  Japan–Singapore 
agreement, in which Japan will offer up to US$3 billion of assistance and Singapore US$1 billion.   
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conditionality  rules,  whereby  initially  only  10%  of  CMI  agreement  funds  could  be 
operated without seeking permission from the IMF. This threshold was later raised to 
20%.
8 Thus, from the start there was some uncertainty over whether the CMI could or 
would be allowed to have any effect if were ever utilized in a future crisis situation. The 
US$200 million ASA was not even activated during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis 
because it was considered too small to have any noticeable impact on the currency 
markets. Given that currency speculators have considerable amounts of currency at their 
disposal— more at least than most central banks—the CMI has always faced some kind 
of credibility problem (Kohlscheen and Taylor 2006).  
 
Why then had APT countries only committed less than US$100 billion to the CMI system 
by 2008? There are three main explanations for this. First, there are various competing 
demands on East Asia‘s foreign exchange reserves, and the majority shares of them are 
tied up in a range of assets, especially US Treasury Bills. This is to spread asset-holding 
risk and make the funds work for interest-yielding gains. Thus, only a proportion of APT 
countries‘ reserves are readily available for immediate counter-speculative actions in the 
currency  markets.  Moreover,  in  one  sense  East  Asian  governments  are  locked  into 
keeping their forex tied in assets like US Treasury Bills as any substantial selling of their 
dollar-denominated assets for conversion purposes would lead to a downward market 
price  effect,  thus  diminishing  the  value  of  their  remaining  dollar-denominated  asset 
stocks. This situation especially applies to large scale dollar stock owners like the PRC 
and Japan. In sum, while APT countries may possess enormous amounts of forex, the 
level of reserves at their immediate disposal is much less. Secondly, the CMI may still be 
considered  a  relatively  young  arrangement  involving  nation-states  with  little  prior 
experience  of  managing  financial  co-operation  of  this  kind  at  either  the  bilateral  or 
regional  level.  In  this  respect,  the  CMI  was  an  important  early  confidence-building 
exercise in the aftermath of the region‘s 1997/98 financial crisis. Hence, it was politically 
expedient to begin with relatively small sums at the outset and then gradually progress 
from this base. Third, the AMF episode made Japan and other APT countries wary of 
any  new  regional  initiative  that  was  perceived  to  challenge  the  IMF‘s  multilateral 
competence  on  international  financial  governance,  thus  the  agreement  to  IMF 
conditionality noted earlier. 
 
 
                                                           
8 This decision was taken at the Eighth APT Finance Ministers meeting held in May 2005.  
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Source: Japan‘s Ministry of Finance and author‘s own research. 
Notes: All swaps denominated in US dollars except for: 
1Japanese yen – Korean won currency swap. 
2Chinese yuan – Korean won currency swap. 
3Japanese yen – 
Chinese yuan currency swap. 
4Chinese yuan – Philippine peso currency swap. These four agreements are denoted in US dollar equivalent (eq.) sums. 
5US$2 billion of 
this arrangement is technically under the precursory New Miyazawa Initiative.  Total sum of CMI agreements by this time was US$93 billion. 
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[Rep. of Korea>Malaysia $1.5bn] 
[Malaysia>Rep. of Korea $1.5bn] 
UUU 
US$ 4bn 
[Rep. of Korea>Indonesia $2bn] 
[Indonesia>Rep. of Korea $2bn] 
UUU 
US$ 3bn 
[Rep. of Korea>Philippines $1.5bn] 
[Philippines>Rep. of Korea $1.5bn] 
 
US$ 8bn (eq.)
 2  
[PRC>Rep. of Korea $4bn eq.] 
[Rep. of Korea>PRC $4bn eq.] 
 
Rep. of Korea>Thailand $1bn] 




[Japan>Rep. of Korea $13bn eq.] 
[Rep. of Korea>Japan $8bn eq.] 
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Table 1: East Asia Foreign Exchange Reserves 
  











































































































































































2008  1,950,000  1,011,000  201,200  181,700  165,677  110,900  91,500  50,181  38,586  21,245  3,821,989  71,245  133,139  102,836  65,493 
2007  1,534,000  973,365  262,224  152,702  162,957  87,455  101,345  56,920  33,751  19,740  3,384,459  70,684  136,235  115,726  97,255 
2006  1,068,490  879,682  238,882  133,168  136,260  65,291  82,133  40,934  20,025  13,384  2,678,249  54,854  41,687  42,652  40,698 
2005  821,514  834,275  210,317  124,244  115,794  50,691  70,172  32,989  15,926  9,051  2,284,973  54,084  45,140  27,753  43,531 
2004  614,500  833,891  198,997  123,540  112,232  48,664  66,384  34,953  13,116  7,041  2,053,318  75,890  48,823  35,314  45,343 
2003  408,151  663,289  155,284  118,360  95,746  41,077  44,515  34,962  13,655  6,224  1,581,263  74,894  50,694  30,187  41,850 
2002  291,128  461,186  121,345  111,896  82,021  38,046  34,222  30,969  13,329  4,121  1,188,263  67,962  51,171  28,365  39,360 
2001  215,605  395,155  102,753  111,155  75,375  32,355  30,474  27,246  13,476  3,675  1,007,269  57,634  51,404  31,749  37,284 
2000  168,278  354,902  96,131  107,542  80,132  32,016  29,523  28,502  13,090  3,417  913,533  56,600  56,891  37,039  43,891 
1999  157,728  286,916  73,987  96,236  76,843  34,063  30,588  26,445  13,230  3,326  799,362  60,500  61,039  39,702  35,870 
1998  149,188  215,471  51,975  89,650  74,928  28,825  25,559  22,713  9,226  2,002  669,537  70,715  74,024  44,312  32,212 
1997  142,762  219,648  20,368  92,804  71,289  26,180  20,788  16,587  7,266  1,986  619,678  58,907  77,587  30,928  32,317 
1996  107,039  216,648  34,037  63,808  76,847  37,731  27,009  18,251  10,030  1,736  593,136  64,041  83,178  26,796  39,896 
1995  75,377  183,250  32,678  55,398  68,695  35,982  23,774  13,708  6,372  1,324  496,558  74,782  85,005  26,853  42,016 
1990  29,586  78,501  14,793  24,568  27,748  13,305  9,754  7,459  924  -  206,638  72,258  67,902  36,778  35,854 
1985  12,728  26,719  2,869  -  12,847  2,190  4,912  4,974  615  -  67,854  32,096  44,380  26,589  12,859 
1980  2,545  24,637  2,925  -  6,567  1,560  4,387  5,392  2,846  -  50,859  15,596  48,592  27,340  20,652 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS); Financial Statistics of the central bank of Taipei,China.  
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The  experience  of  the 1997/98 financial  crisis  motivated  East  Asian  governments  to 
stockpile  forex  as  a  defense  mechanism  against  future  speculative  attacks  on  their 
currency (Aizenman and Marion 2003). One could therefore argue that this stockpiling at 
the  national  level  in  East  Asia  has  made  the  CMI  seem  increasingly  redundant, 
especially to those countries with large forex stocks. However, Table 1 indicates that as 
a consequence of the current 2008/09 global financial crisis a number of East Asian 
countries have seen their forex levels fall (e.g., Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia), while 
for others their rates of growth have dropped sharply (Singapore and Japan). Vulnerable 
countries such as Indonesia considered activating their CMI swap arrangements,
10 and if 
instability and uncertainty in global financial markets continues into 2010 and beyond 
then a number of other APT countries may also consider the same course of action. 
However, in October 2008 the central banks of Korea and Singapore (along with those 
of  Mexico  and  Brazil)  signed  temporary  US$30  billion  BCSAs  with  the  US Federal 
Reserve,  perhaps  indicating  the two  East  Asian  countries  lack  of faith  in  the  CMI.
11 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand had also previously signed BCSAs with the US. The 
decision of Korea and Singapore to choose this path rather than seek activation of its 
sizable BCSAs with the PRC and Japan through the CMI poses questions concerning 
the robustness of regional financial co-operation in East Asia. If no IMF conditionality 
clauses were attached to operating the CMI—as was the case with the US currency 
agreements—then  perhaps  a  different  decision  would  have  been  reached.  The  new 
agreements with the US were, as mentioned, temporary and expired in April 2009. 
 
Partly in response to the current global financial crisis and partly as a result of longer-
term plans to substantially develop the CMI, a key decision was made by APT finance 
officials at a meeting held in February 2009 to multilateralize the system of BCSAs into a 
regional liquidity fund. The initial decision to outline the basis for this plan was made at 
the  May  2007  APT  Finance  Ministers  Meeting.  The  new  scheme—the  Chiang  Mai 
Initiative  Multilateralized  (CMIM)—will  convert  the  16  bilateral  agreements  into  a 
common funding pool of forex (raised to US$120 billion) from which members could 
draw upon in times of crisis. This plan will essentially create something very similar to 
the  aforementioned  AMF  proposed  by  Japan  in  1997  and  supported  at  the  time  by 
Taipei,China. It was agreed that 80% of the CMIM fund would be provided by Japan, the 
PRC, and Korea. Depending on how substantially the new CMIM is developed, it could 
play a key role in establishing a regional exchange rate system, another idea that has 
been raised in APT meetings and studied by some East Asian governments, especially 
Japan. It is expected that the CMIM will become operational sometime in 2010.
12 
 
  2.2.3   The Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) 
 
The  Asian  Bond  Markets  Initiative  (ABMI)  was  the  second  new  structure  of regional 
financial  co-operation  to  emerge  from  the  APT  framework.  Like  the  CMI,  the  ABMI 
provides East Asia with the opportunity to utilize the region‘s huge financial resources for 
promoting  its  own  regional  financial  stability  and  economic  development,  rather than 
                                                           
10   Reuters. 17 March 2009. 
11 US Federal Reserve News Release. 29 October 2008. 
12 Xiahua News. 23 October 2009.  
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investing in or diverting these resources to other regions or countries. East Asia not only 
has huge foreign exchange reserves, but also has very high levels of domestic savings 
at around 30%–40% of gross domestic product (GDP). A large proportion of the region‘s 
financial  resources  have  over  time  been  invested  in  bonds  and  other  securities 
originating outside the region, especially in advanced industrial countries like the US. 
East Asia‘s own capital markets have generally been slow to develop, with only higher 
income countries like Japan and Korea having established credible markets for bonds. 
Moreover, local-currency-denominated bonds were not internationalized. For example, in 
2004 only 4% of Japanese government bonds were held outside the country.
13 
 
A bond is usually a fixed-interest, long-term security that can be issued by governments, 
firms, banks, or other institutions. The ABMI is designed to foster domestic and regional 
bond market development in East Asia, with a general view to better utilizing the region‘s 
substantial  financial  resources  towards  meeting  the  region‘s  investment  needs.  In 
contrast  to  the  CMI,  which  provides  a  mechanism  for  short-term  counteractions  to 
financial  market  instability,  the  ABMI  forms  a  basis  for  gradually  strengthening  East 
Asia‘s  long-term  financial  market  development.  In  this  sense,  the  ABMI  may  be 
considered more strategic in conception than the CMI, as it moves East Asia beyond 
measures  simply  aimed  at  crisis-aversion  towards  more  substantive  financial  market 
integration.  In  further  contrast,  the  ABMI  is  more  a  regional  co-ordination  project 
involving several countries initiating their own new local currency bond issues with the 
assistance  of  the  ADB  and  other  agencies,  leading  to  a  particular  form  of  financial 
market regionalization in which the private sector plays a key role. The CMI, on the other 
hand, arguably involves greater levels of region-wide co-operation amongst East Asian 
states as the scheme‘s currency swaps are international agreements in which at least 
one partner is obligated to assist the other in times of financial difficulty. It is therefore 
more likely that the CMI will develop into a region-wide governance mechanism akin to 
financial regionalism than the ABMI (Grimes and Kimura 2005). 
 
Like the CMI, the ABMI  was conceived in crisis aversion terms. A key cause of the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis was the over reliance on short-term borrowing in foreign 
currencies by East  Asian firms, banks,  and other  institutions. After  East Asia‘s huge 
accumulation of savings had been initially deposited in local banks, much of it was then 
funneled to international financial centers and a significant amount was in turn invested 
back into the region but mostly in the form of short-term loans. Pempel (2000) usefully 
summarizes the situation: ―Foreign capital was readily available at low interest rates. 
Meanwhile, rates on local debt were about double that for foreign debt. Consequently, 
local banks found it highly profitable to borrow overseas and lend locally: most domestic 
loans were short-term, with multiple roll-overs expected to complete long-term projects.‖ 
This made the region prone to the maturity and currency ―double mismatch‖ problem 
after sharp currency depreciations had significantly inflated the short-term foreign loan 
payments East Asian firms were obliged to make to overseas banks. Many of these 
firms did not have sufficient investment returns or other funds on stream to help meet 
these payments, leading to mass bankruptcies and a banking crisis. This was a key 
trigger of a wider financial crisis in the region. In addition, the region‘s local banking 
systems  had  developed  an  over-reliance  on  equity  markets  to  fund  the  investment 
                                                           
13 Business Times Singapore. 24 May 2004.  
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demands  of  East  Asian  companies,  which  were  over-dependent  on  banks  in  raising 
finance.  Investing  in  long-term,  local  currency  bonds  issued  by  governments  and 
companies would help avoid these predicaments and make East Asia financially more 
self-sustainable as a region in the longer run (Plummer and Click 2005). Developing an 
Asian  regional  bond  market  would  also  enable  wider  currency  diversification  to  take 
place,  leading  to  East  Asian  countries  becoming  less  dependent  on  US  dollar-
denominated assets in particular. 
 
Although the ABMI has mainly developed through APT processes, these have worked in 
tandem with certain other related institutions and organizations. Discussions about the 
creation  of  the  ABMI  were  first  made  at  the  APT  Deputy  Ministers  Meeting  held  in 
Chiang Mai in December 2002. The scheme was further considered a few months later 
in June 2003 at an Executives Meeting of East Asian Central Banks (EMEAP) group 
meeting, where its eleven member state representatives agreed to establish an Asian 
Bond  Fund  with  initial  capital  of  US$1.0  billion.
14  The  ABMI  plan  was  then  formally 
endorsed at the APT Finance Ministers Meeting held in August 2003. In the following 
month the ADB gave grants to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand to help 
them develop domestic bond markets as part of the APT‘s new Guarantee Mechanism 
for the ABMI.
15 In April 2004, the EMEAP group gave its approval to launch a much 
larger Second Asian Bond Fund worth around US$11 billion. As with the first Asian Bond 
Fund,  this  was  to  be  managed  on  behalf  of  the  central  banks  by  the  Bank  for 
International Settlements‘ office in Hong Kong, China. Unlike the first fund, these new 
bonds were denominated in local Asian currencies rather than in US dollars. Also with 
the second fund, forex  could be  used for the first time to purchase these new local 
currency bonds.  
 
The Second Asian Bond Fund was implemented beginning in May 2005 with the ADB 
playing an instrumental part in issuing the bonds in domestic markets. The ADB‘s role in 
developing the ABMI is indicative of the organization‘s growing involvement in promoting 
East Asian economic regionalism. ADB helped Japan establish its first domestic bond 
market  in  the  early  1970s,  and  provided  similar  assistance  in  other  East  Asian 
economies up until the 1997/98 financial crisis, including in Hong Kong, China; Korea; 
Singapore; and Taipei,China. Since the ABMI‘s launch in 2003, ADB has provided new 
bond issue assistance to a wider range of East Asian countries, including the PRC, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. By the end of 2004, East Asian local 
currency bond markets had tripled in size since the 1997/98 financial crisis. ADB‘s Asia 
Bond Monitor reported at this time, however, that the region accounted for only 3% of 
the total amount of local currency bonds outstanding worldwide.
16 In November 2006, 
ADB  reported  that  the  volume  of  the  region‘s  outstanding  local  currency  bonds  had 
expanded from US$2.0 trillion to US$2.4 trillion over the first half of 2006.
17 Yet, this was 
                                                           
14 The EMEAP group was first established in 1991 at the initiative of the Bank of Japan. Its membership 
comprises  the  central  banks  from  Australia;  the  People‘s  Republic  of  China;  Hong  Kong,  China; 
Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; the Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand. 
15 INQ7 News (Philippines). 31 October 2003. 
16 China View. 23 November 2004. 
17 ADB Press Release. 15 November 2006.  
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still some way behind the dollar-denominated bond market valued at US$16.8 trillion, of 
which about 30% are government issues.
18 In May 2008, a new ABMI road map was 
agreed upon at the Eleventh APT Finance Ministers Meeting to have member countries 
voluntarily develop local currency bond markets.  
 
While the ABMI had made an important contribution to bond market growth in the region, 
ADB has also stated that there remains huge scope for further expansion. Surveys long 
indicated the significant potential demand for  local currency bonds  in East  Asia.  For 
example,  ADB  estimated  that  between  2005  and  2010,  East  Asia  would  require 
US$180 billion  (approximately  6%–7%  of  the  region‘s  annual  GDP)  in  new  physical 
infrastructure investments.
19 According to a Citigroup report, Asia‘s investment needs 
would be around US$20 trillion between 2005 and 2015, and that the long-term and 




2.2.4   East Asia Regional Financial Governance and the Global Financial 
Crisis 
 
The CMI and ABMI were both launched in the early 2000s in response to the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis. Both schemes have made some level of substantive progress. A 
third scheme, the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) system proposed in 2006, while failing to 
take  off  owing  to  political  difficulties  and  institutional  constraints  within  the  APT 
framework, could still be re-launched in the near future (Kawai 2008). So how have post-
1997/98 developments in APT-led regional financial governance prepared East Asia in 
coping with the current global financial crisis? 
 
Many have criticized these APT schemes for lacking ambition as well as both the APT 
and EAS frameworks for their inability to forge an effective and unified response to the 
global financial crisis (Drysdale 2008, 2009; Sheng 2009; Soesastro 2009; Yap 2008). 
Despite  its recent  upgrading,  the  CMI  remains  generally  under-funded  and  plans for 
multilateralizing the system can be traced back at least to 2007, so this was not strictly a 
specific response to the financial turmoil of 2008/09. Moreover, the system‘s bilateral 
currency swaps have yet to be activated. The ABMI is an active scheme with laudable 
objectives,  but  it  could  have  made  considerably  more  progress  under  stronger 
leadership from APT member governments. More generally, the APT/EAS group has 
lacked a cohesive approach towards the current crisis at recent international and global 
level  meetings.  For  example,  Asian  members  of  the  G20  failed  to  consult  with  one 
another in preparation for the November 2008 meeting held in Washington DC (Yap 
2008).  The  aforementioned  decisions  of  Korea  and  Singapore  to  sign  US$30 billion 
currency swap deals with the US rather than seek activation of their agreements with 
CMI partners also showed a demonstrative lack of faith in East Asia‘s regional financial 
co-operation schemes. 
 
                                                           
18 Ibid. 
19 ADB Press Release. 05 August 2004. 
20 Business Times. 24 May 2004.  
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Two new measures have been proposed at the track II level by a group of high-profile 
economists  under  the  aegis  of  the  Asian  Development  Bank  Institute  (ADBI)  (ADBI 
2009, Drydale 2009). The first of these was an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue (AFSD) 
that would essentially facilitate policy co-ordination for financial sector stability, reform, 
and  development  by  bringing  together  finance  ministry,  central  bank,  and  financial 
market regulatory and supervisory agencies across the region. According to Drysdale 
(2009), the AFSD could ―share information, harmonize prudential indicators, increase 
coordination  on  conducting  early  warning  system  analysis,  and  discuss  more  openly 
national and regional policy interventions,‖ as well as promote  East  Asia‘s long-term 
financial  market  development  and  integration.  Many  of  these  functions  are  already 
supposed to be served by the APT‘s Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) 
mechanism, so this new proposal is essentially an ERPD upgrade. The second proposal 
is  for  creating  an  Asian  Infrastructure  Investment  Fund  (AIIF)  as  a  mechanism  for 
channeling funds towards meeting the region‘s various infrastructural needs, which has 
been one of the key objectives of the ABMI, so any overlap between them would have to 
be managed accordingly. At the time of writing, these two proposed schemes had yet to 
be formally considered and endorsed by APT governments.  
 
2.2.5   Other Aspects of APT Regional Co-operation 
 
While  improving  regional  financial  governance  remains  a  core  task  of  the  APT,  its 
agenda has also expanded to embrace various other issues, including small business 
development,  environmental  technologies,  infrastructure  logistics,  food  and  health 
security  issues,  human  resource  development,  e-commerce,  energy  resource 
management, pollution abatement, international migration, maritime piracy, information 
communications  technology  (ICT)  co-operation,  customs  information  exchange, 
agricultural technology, and management training programs. In the early 2000s, the East 
Asia  Vision  Group  (EAVG)  and  East  Asia  Study  Group  (EASG)  provided  ideas  and 
subsequent impetus on where and how to advance regional co-operation in East Asia 
(EAVG 2001, EASG 2002). Examples of the 26 specific recommendations made by the 
EASG report, which were published for adoption at the 2002 summit, included: 
 
(i)  Short-term measures: East Asia human resource development program, 
network of East Asia Think Tanks, East Asia Forum, East Asia Business 
Council,  poverty  alleviation  programs,  and  regional  identity-building 
exercises. 
(ii)  Medium- to long-term measures: high-level conference on investment and 
SMEs; feasibility study on an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA); East 
Asia Summit; regional financing facility; expansion of ASEAN Investment 
Area to an East Asia Investment Area arrangement; and a framework for 
energy policies, strategies, and action plans. 
Plans to initiate or expand the study of the majority of the above measures have been 
undertaken. One EASG-recommended initiative that has been moved forward concerns 
the APT Workshops on Promoting East Asian Identity and Consciousness. The second 
such workshop was convened in November 2006 in Brunei Darussalam and is seen as  
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an essential part of the East Asia community building process.
21 In the same month, 
APT  diplomacy  led  to  Japan,  the  PRC,  and  Korea  joining  ASEAN‘s  emergency  rice 
reserve program, first set up in 1979, to create a new and much extended East Asia 
Emergency  Rice  Reserve  (EAERR)  system,  boosting  the  original  ASEAN  system 
reserve  from  87,000  tons  to  500,000  tons.
22  The  EAERR  initially  operated  as  a 
temporary arrangement over 3 years, expiring in early 2010 and essentially serving the 
ASEAN countries. The EAERR consisted of rice stocks held in each member state that 
were earmarked for emergency distribution within Southeast Asia should the need arise. 
This was set within the context of APT endeavors to improve regional food security and 
safeguard rural livelihoods in the region, as well as to put in place systems for meeting 
humanitarian  needs  during  periods  of  emergencies  or  natural  disasters.  At  the 
October 2009 APT summit, plans were discussed to make the EAERR a permanent 
system,  although  these  were  hampered  by  a  dispute  between  Thailand  and  the 
Philippines  over  rice  import  tariffs  in  relation  to  implementing  AFTA  liberalization  on 
agricultural products.
23 Although conventional security issues such as the Democratic 
People‘s Republic of Korea‘s nuclear program have been discussed at APT meetings, 
they have not become codified into the APT agenda or works program.  
 
2.3   Organizational Structure and Institutional Processes 
 
APT‘s organizational structure and institutionalized processes are closely entwined with 
ASEAN‘s, as APT summits are held at the conclusion of ASEAN summits and therefore 
only ASEAN countries are eligible to host them. APT has nevertheless developed a wide 
range  of mechanisms for  diplomatic  interaction  and  dialogue,  as  well  as  a  series of 
instruments  for  advancing  regional  co-operation  and  integration  amongst  East  Asian 
countries.  By  2009,  the  APT  framework  had  over  50  consultative  bodies  working  in 
around 20 different fields. The range of Ministerial Meetings has gradually expanded 
over time to cover 15 policy areas. The details of their initiation and regularity are given 
below.  
 
(i)  Annual:  Finance  (1999),  Economic  (2000),  Foreign  (2000),  Agriculture 
and Forestry (2000), Environment (2002), Tourism (2002), Energy (2004). 
(ii)  Biennial:  Labor  (2001),  Culture  and  Arts  (2003),  Public  and  Internal 
Security (Transnational Crime, 2004), Health (2004), Youth (2007). 
(iii)  Triennial: Social Welfare (2003). 
(iv)  Irregular:  Telecommunications  and  Information  Technology  (2004), 
Science and Technology (2006). 
The Ministerial Meeting process works in close co-ordination with APT‘s Senior Officials 
Meetings (SOM) process, which covers the 19 policy areas noted below. 
(i)  Annual:  Finance  (1999),  Economic  (2000),  Foreign  (2000),  Agriculture 
and Forestry (2001), Labor (2001), Energy (2002), Tourism (2002), Public 
and  Internal  Security  (2003),  Telecommunications  and  Information 
                                                           
21 Brunei Darussalam Darussalam Darussalam Times. 09 November 2006. 
22 Bloomberg News. 22 November 2006. 
23 Philippine Daily Inquirer. 26 October 2009.  
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Technology (2003), Health (2003), Social Welfare (2003), Environment 
(2004), Disaster Management (2006), Minerals (2006). 
(ii)  Biennial: Culture and Arts (2003), Youth (2004), Rural Development and 
Poverty Eradication (2006). 
(iii)  Irregular: Science and Technology (2006), Women (2006). 
 
Below the SOM level of inter-governmental meetings are two underpinning sub-levels of 
meetings  (Figure  2).  The  first  sub-level  is  the  Director–Generals  Meetings  (DGMs), 
established in 2003 and held twice a year, which work in the same policy areas as the 
SOMs. The DGMs are charged with the following tasks: 
 
(i)  implementing the APT Co-operation Work Plan (2007–2017), reviewing 
its  identified  priority  areas,  and  revising  them  biennially  based  on  the 
urgency and current issues in the region; co-ordinating with the ASEAN 
Secretariat where necessary;  
(ii)  co-ordinating and implementing the measures in the EASG Final Report; 
(iii)  identifying regional priorities for East Asia co-operation; 
(iv)  co-ordinating East Asia co-operation under the APT process generally; 
(v)  promoting functional co-operation in East Asia; and 
(vi)  reporting their work to the APT Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
 
At the lower  sub-level is the Director–Generals Working Group Meetings (DGWGM), 
established  2005  and  held  twice  a  year,  which  work  under  the  DGM  process.  The 
DGWGM undertakes the following tasks: 
 
(i)  assists in the preparation of relevant documents submitted for the DGMs; 
(ii)  reviews the status of APT development co-operation activities and their 
implementation; 
(iii)  makes recommendations to the DGMs for their approval, especially with 
regard  to  proposed  co-operation  activities,  to  ensure  the  smooth 
implementation of APT co-operative activities; and 
(iv)  works  closely  with  the  External  Relations  Divisions  of  the  ASEAN 
Secretariat in undertaking the above tasks. 
 
A number of supporting institutions have arisen from APT diplomacy (Figure 2). The 
East Asia Business Council (EABC) was established April 2004 and comprises three 
members of the private sector from each of the APT countries who are appointed by 
their  respective  economic  minister.  The  EABC‘s  main  purpose  is  to  provide  private-
sector  perspective  and  feedback  into  APT  discussions  on  how  to  deepen  regional 
economic co-operation and expand the region‘s economic growth. The EABC also works 
to strengthen co-operation among the private sectors in APT countries. The Network of 
East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) was created in 2003 as a track II process to provide 
APT with collective research capacity and intellectual support for studying issues of East 
Asian regional co-operation and integration. The work of NEAT is largely derived from 
issues and initiatives identified by APT meetings, and feeds back to this process through 
policy recommendations. Further analytical capacity on AP- related matters is provided  
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by an expert group set up in 2005 to conduct a feasibility study on an East Asia Free 
Trade Area, and also by the APT Research Group that was established in 2003 and 
focuses specifically on financial co-operation. Its participants consist of finance ministry 
and central bank officials that meet on an ad hoc basis and to discuss research topics 
endorsed  at  the  APT  Finance  Ministerial  Meeting.  Research  Group  officials  focus 
especially  on  medium-  and  long-term  challenges  for  further  regional  financial  co-
operation  facing  East  Asian  countries,  and  work  closely  with  the  region‘s  research 
institutions. Reports of their activities are presented at APT finance meetings.  
 
Since  2002,  the  APT  Informal  Finance  and  Central  Bank  Deputies  Meeting  has 
convened  twice  a  year  as  a  policy  dialogue  arrangement  between  Finance  Vice 
Ministers and Deputy Governors of Central Banks. The APT Biomass-Asia Workshop, 
created in 2005, holds annual meetings to examine key issues on biomass policies, 
technologies, and capacity building in East Asia, and bring together government officials, 
private sector representatives, and researchers working in this field. More recently, the 
APT Nuclear Energy Safety Forum and the APT Natural Gas Forum were established in 
2007  with  the  purpose  of  strengthening  policy  dialogue  and  regional  co-operation 
amongst East Asian countries in their respective energy policy areas.  
 
A number of other APT energy fora have also been created (Figure 2). APT‘s work on 
promoting  stronger  East  Asian  socio-cultural  unity  has  been  carried  out  through  the 
Networking of East Asian Cultural Heritage (NEACH) and the Network of East Asian 
Studies (NEAS). The work of these groups has been underpinned by a series of joint 
statements, accords, and initiatives aimed to commit APT countries to realizing deeper 
regional co-operation across a range of areas. These include the following: 
 
(i)  Comprehensive Human Resources Development Program for East Asia 
(2003); 
(ii)  Agricultural Technology and Management Training Program for ASEAN 
Countries (2003); 
(iii)  APT Website for Customs Information Exchange (2004); 
(iv)  Poverty Alleviation Programs (2005); 
(v)  Cultural  and  Educational  Institutions  to  Promote  a  Strong  Sense  of 
Identity and an East Asian Consciousness (2005); 
(vi)  East  Asian  Studies  in  the  Region  (Network  on  East  Asian  Studies  – 
NEAS,  2005); 
(vii)  Networking and Exchanges of Experts in the Conservation of the Arts, 
Artifacts, and Cultural Heritage of East Asian Countries (NEACH, 2005); 
(viii)  APT Logistics Co-operation for Future Trade Facilitation (2006); 
(ix)  APT Co-operation for Internationally Comparable Statistics (2006); 
(x)  Joint Declaration on Energy Security (2007); and 
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Although APT may not strictly be considered a regional organization, it has nevertheless 
developed relatively extensive structures of networked relationships amongst East Asian 
government  officials,  private  sector  representatives,  and  research  analysts  that  are 
almost comparable to APEC and much more substantive than the EAS. Furthermore, 
while finance remains the area where APT has made the most important advances in 
regional co-operation and integration, the regional framework has created a broad RCI 
agenda that has particularly focused on economic and technical co-operation issues. As 
we later examine, this is in contrast to APEC‘s prioritization of commercial liberalization 
and  neo-liberal-oriented  regulatory  reform.  The  introduction  of  the  APT  Co-operation 
Work Plan (2007–2017), adopted at the 2007 APT Summit, is illustrative of APT‘s prime 
emphasis on economic and technical co-operation. This serves as the master plan to 
enhance APT relations and co-operation in a comprehensive and holistic framework, 
with a view to reinforcing efforts to create the ASEAN Economic, Socio-Cultural, and 
Security Communities by 2015. 
  
Activities  based  on  the  APT  Co-operation  Work  Plan  were  implemented  with  initial 
funding support from the PRC, Japan, and Korea. However, a new APT Co-operation 
Fund was introduced in 2009 to help finance Work Plan projects. Areas of co-operation 
parallel APT‘s meetings and dialogue structure, which lay out principles of good conduct 
across a range of broad thematic headings on (i) political and security co-operation; (ii) 
economic  and  financial  co-operation;  (iii)  energy,  environment,  climate  change,  and 
sustainable  development  co-operation;  and    (iv)  socio-cultural  and  development  co-
operation.  
 
The institutional identity of APT is, of course, bound up with that of ASEAN and the two 
External  Relations  Divisions  (one  covering  political  and  security  relations,  the  other 
economic  relations),  with  the  ASEAN  Secretariat  performing  certain  co-ordinating 
functions between the two institutions. In one sense, APT provides an important level of 
support  to  ASEAN,  for  example,  by  working  in  unison  to  realize  the  organization‘s 
objectives on regional community building.  
 
As outlined in the previous section, APT has developed close inter-institutional linkages 
with the ADB on financial co-operation regarding the CMI, ABMI, and other schemes. 
Regarding the APT Economic Review and Policy Dialogue, ADB supports regional policy 
dialogues to help East Asian countries in their collaborative efforts in promoting financial 
stability and growth. This has become even more critical in light of the 2008/09 global 
financial crisis, and these regional policy dialogues are intended to bring about better co-
ordination  of fiscal  and monetary  policy  responses for  regional financial  stability  and 
growth. With regard to the APT Surveillance Process, the ADB prepares biennial reports 
on  regional  macroeconomic  performance,  forecasts,  and  policy  issues,  which  are 
presented and discussed at various APT Finance and Central Bank Deputies meetings. 
In May 2009, East Asia‘s Finance Ministers agreed to establish an APT Macroeconomic 
Research Office (AMRO) to support the CMIM. When formally created, AMRO will be an 
independent regional surveillance unit to monitor and analyze regional economies. In the 
meantime,  ADB  and  the  ASEAN  Secretariat  established  an  interim  surveillance 
arrangement  based  on the  existing  surveillance  processes.  ADB  is  also  expected  to 
provide  technical  assistance  to  support  the  CMIM  surveillance  process,  including 
capacity building in the early phase of the establishment of AMRO. With respect to the  
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ABMI,  ADB  worked  with  APT  to  establish  the  US$700 million  Credit  Guarantee  and 
Investment  Facility  (CGIF)  in  April  2010,  which  will  provide  credit  guarantees  for 
domestic  bonds  to  meet  financing  needs  and  will  help  develop  the  region‘s  local 
currency bond markets. ADB also supports a number of capacity building programs for 
APT officials and staff, for example, by providing technical assistance for the training of 




2.4   Impacts and Key Challenges for the Future 
 
As  APT  was  the  first  exclusively  East  Asian  regional  grouping  of  substance  to  be 
created, those with a strong interest or stake in East Asian regional community building 
have particularly high expectations for what APT can achieve. During the aftermath of 
the  1997/98  Asian  financial  crisis,  APT  was  able  to  break  new  ground  in  regional 
financial co-operation and gradually expanded its agenda to embrace other important 
regional affairs. However, it is in the area of finance that APT has made the most notable 
advances in regional co-operation and integration. The CMIM could be the foundation for 
developing a future system of exchange rate co-operation or co-ordination that, in turn, 
could lead to deeper monetary integration. However, this is likely to take some time to 
progress given the region‘s economic asymmetries and uneasy political relationships, 
e.g. between the PRC and Japan. In the meantime, APT should look to develop new 
instruments, agreements, and other institutional mechanisms for regional co-operation in 
other areas. As we have seen, it has become increasingly focused on a number of ―new 
security‖ issues (e.g. food security, energy security) and its activities and dialogues have 
especially centered on economic and technical assistance and development capacity 
building.  This  is  consistent  with  the  general  principles  on  which  East  Asia  regional 
community building has hitherto been broadly based, such as the kinds of quasi-regional 
FTAs being signed in the region (e.g. Japan–ASEAN). Thus, an APT-based regional 
trade  agreement  would  be  expected  to  combine  liberalization  with  economic  co-
operation measures. Future APT regional agreements on new security issues will also 
most likely have a strong development capacity building dimension. East Asia‘s weaker 
and  poorer  nations  can  at  the  moment  only  make  limited  contributions  to  regional 
community  building  processes  owing  to  various  capacity  deficiencies.  The  region‘s 
stronger  powers  (especially  Japan  and  the  PRC)  are  making  a  difference  through 
bilateral channels of assistance, and it may be that variable geometry arrangements of 
regional co-operation, based on subset country participation, will arise in certain future 
agreements. However, advancing APT co-operation on new security issues will prove 
difficult  in  areas  where  competition  between  national  interests  is  intense,  such  as 
securing energy supplies. 
 
Another key challenge that faces both APT and the EAS is the question of regional 
leadership. This is a critical issue as leadership provides a vital source of strategic vision 
and  initiative  for  co-operative  ventures,  and  often  the  necessary  public  goods  (e.g. 
technocratic resources) that enable co-operation to function effectively (Dent 2008b). If 
the PRC and Japan were to pursue strategies of trying to counter the other‘s exercises 
of  regional  leadership  in  East  Asia,  then  this  would  seriously  constrain  regional 
                                                           
24 This information was provided by ADB‘s Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI).  
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community  building.  Alternative  paths  of  action  could  include  a  Sino-Japanese 
agreement on what division of leadership tasks could be arranged between them, or a 
working formula for exercises of balanced co-leadership. However, such arrangements 
would need to be made across both the APT and EAS regional frameworks, especially 
because Beijing prefers the former and Tokyo the latter as the foundation for East Asian 
regional community building. 
 
Unresolved issues between APT and the EAS are discussed in more detail at the end of 
the following EAS section. APT‘s head-start advantage over EAS largely explains why it 
may be considered a far more substantive regional framework, yet it still lacks a strong 
independent institutional identity and the capacity to realize its potential for advancing 
regional  co-operation  in  East  Asia.  This  will  continue  while  it  remains  dependent  on 
associate  regional  organizations,  especially  the  ASEAN  Secretariat  and  ADB.  At  the 
same  time,  both  of  these  organizations  have  played  an  important  intermediary  and 
facilitating  role  in  APT  co-operation.  A  new  name  (non-ASEAN  derived)  and  an 
independent Secretariat would be needed to strengthen APT‘s corporate identity and 




3.   East Asia Summit (EAS) 
 
3.1   Origins and Early Development 
 
The EAS framework may in one sense be considered a spin-off of the APT framework. 
The idea for establishing an EAS was first raised at the 2000 APT Summit in Singapore. 
Thereafter, the EAS Group was charged with examining the proposal and reporting back 
with its recommendations. These essentially focused on the desirability of transforming 
APT into a more coherent and developed regional framework in which any APT member 
could  host  a  summit,  not  just  an  ASEAN  country.  The  EAS  also  embodied  a  more 
holistic regional concept and not just an appendage arrangement to ASEAN. A further 
perceived advantage of the EAS over APT was that it would potentially confer the PRC, 
Japan, and Korea a greater sense of ownership over the East Asia regional community 
building process.  
 
It was initially believed that APT would simply evolve into the EAS, subsuming all of its 
work  programs  and  adopting  its  framework  structure.  This  was  the  general 
understanding that prevailed up until the November 2004 APT Summit.
25 However, the 
EAS became neither a substitute for APT nor a distinctly separate mechanism in its own 
right during the latter half of the 2000s. The main underlying reason for this is that EAS 
membership  not  only  comprises  APT  countries,  but  also—primarily  at  Japan  and 
Indonesia‘s insistence—India, Australia, and New Zealand. The first EAS was held in 
December 2005 and hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur. Much of the discussion at the 
meeting revolved around membership issues and what value the EAS framework could 
                                                           
25 Associated Press. 29 November 2004.  
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add  to  the  regional  community  building  process  beyond  what  was  already  being 
achieved by APT.  
 
3.2   Issue Coverage, Agenda Setting and Instrumentalization 
 
The EAS framework is still a relatively institutional arrangement that possesses a rather 
limited degree of organizational substance. The issues covered at EAS gatherings are 
primarily driven by regional and global events, or by initiatives and proposals made by 
individual member  states. EAS lacks the multi-structured and programmatic dialogue 
processes that can be found in APEC, ASEAN, and APT. Japan is the key advocate of 
the EAS and to help consolidate the new regional grouping it pushed the idea of an 
EAS-based free trade area through formal proposals made in April and August 2006. It 
is  now  a  generally  held  view  that  Japan‘s  strategic  interest  in  broadening  the 
membership of the EAS was to counterbalance an ascendant PRC in any emerging East 
Asian regional organization or framework. Japan‘s predilection for a broad East Asian 
grouping, however, pre-dates the EAS‘ inception (Hund 2003). In the mid-1990s, Tokyo 
had advocated the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the ASEM framework, 
partly as a legacy of Japan‘s earlier Pacific orientations in regional community building. 
However,  the  PRC,  Malaysia  and  others  have  occasionally  argued  for  a  more 
conventional East Asian grouping.
26  
 
The PRC‘s stated opposition to a broad extra-regional EAS membership centered on 
how the regional body might become too unwieldy and incoherent if the interests of 
many disparate nations were to be accommodated. Moreover, Beijing argued that the 
greater the number of countries involved, the less integrated and coherent a future East 
Asian community would be.
27 Japan, though, lobbied other East Asian nations hard on 
the issue of EAS membership issue and managed to secure enough support for its own 
position. It was also agreed at a May 2006 meeting of ASEAN senior officials that EAS 
membership  would  be  frozen  for  at  least  2 years.  This  was  in  response  to  various 
countries expressing their interest in joining the group, namely Russia (observer status 
gained at the First East Asia Summit, full membership supported by the PRC); Pakistan 
and Mongolia (supported by Malaysia); Bangladesh (supported by Japan); and Papua 
New Guinea (supported by Australia). The EU has noted its wish to gain observer status, 
while  the  US  has  also  sought  involvement  in  the  EAS  at  a  level  that  has  not  been 
clarified.  
 
As will be discussed below, the EAS agenda has been largely shaped by reactions to 
regional and global events rather than programmatic strategizing from within its rather 
thin institutional structure. In addition, energy and the environment have been two issue 
areas  where  the  EAS  has  made  the  most  apparent  progress  on  regionalized  co-
operation  and  dialogue.  The  EAS  can  make  important  contributions  to  regional 
community  building  it  were  to  specialize  in  a  few  issue  areas  and  develop  the 
institutional  architecture  to  manage  these  accordingly.  For  as  long  as  it  remains  a 
                                                           
26 For example, Thailand and the Philippines, along with Malaysia, were more inclined to support the 
PRC‘s APT-based regional free trade area idea rather than Japan‘s EAS-based alternative. 
27 Asahi Shimbun. 04 November 2005; The Yomiuri Shimbun. 25 November 2005.  
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reactive forum to events, and its relationship with APT continues to be undefined, the 
EAS is likely to linger on as just another high-level dialogue framework. 
 
3.3   Organizational Structure and Institutional Processes 
 
In contrast to APT, the EAS has limited organizational substance. Aside from its summit 
meetings, annual EAS Foreign Minister  informal consultations (as opposed to formal 
Ministerial Meetings) and EAS Environmental Ministers Meetings have been convened 
since 2008, EAS Energy Ministers Meetings since 2007, and EAS Economic Ministers 
Meetings since 2006. Senior Officials Meetings have also been held in these four policy 
areas  and,  like  APT  meetings,  are  tagged  on  to  the  end  of  corresponding  ASEAN 
meetings. The EAS is seen as essentially a leaders-led forum with the aim of responding 
―promptly  to  any  emerging  challenges  and  adjust[ing]  appropriately  to  the  changing 
regional and international landscape.‖
28 
 
A  few  additional  groups  and  activities  comprise  the  EAS‘s  institutional  structure, 
especially in the work areas of energy and environment. The EAS Energy Cooperation 
Task Force (ECTF) was established in March 2007 and focuses on three areas for co-
operation: (i) energy efficiency and conservation, (ii) energy market integration, and (iii) 
bio-fuels for transport and for other purposes. The ECTF has organized a number of 
workshops and seminars on these issues. The Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy 
Security, signed at the Second East Asian Summit meeting in January 2007, underpins 
the ECTF‘s work in the above areas. In addition, the PRC hosted the EAS Seminar on 
Capacity Building for Climate Change Adaptation in October 2008. An EAS Asia Pacific 
Regional  Media  Program  has  been  created,  and  an  EAS  initiative  led  to  the 
establishment of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia in 2008. 
The  EAS  is  also  responsible  for  overseeing  the  feasibility  study  process  on  the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA). Like APT, the External 
Relations Divisions of the ASEAN Secretariat play a co-ordinating role between ASEAN 
and East Asia Summit activities and meetings. 
 
3.4   Impacts and Key Issues for the Future 
 
The EAS was established some years after the APT regional framework and has not 
developed  anywhere  near  the  same  level  of  institutional  substance  or  regional  co-
operative mechanisms as APT. Evidence from the Asia–Pacific and elsewhere around 
the  world  suggests  that  bigger  regional  groups  are  better  suited  for  promoting  and 
developing  dialogue  (e.g.  APEC,  ASEM),  while  smaller  regional  groups  are  able  to 
advance regional integration and co-operation at a deeper level. This is because the 
former have by their nature a wider range of diverse interests to reconcile, while the 
latter  are  more  likely  to  establish  a  basis  for  common  action  based  on  a  stronger 
likelihood of shared interests and more coherent linkages. In relation to APT, the EAS 
framework could therefore offer a broader and more outward-looking dialogue forum for 
discussing political, economic, and other foreign policy issues.  In essence, then, the 
EAS would concentrate on being a dialogue process and APT would be an East Asian 
integration process, with each reinforcing the other by focusing on linked issues.  
                                                           
28 Chair‘s Statement, Second EAS Foreign Ministers Informal Consultations.   
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Some relatively lower-level regional co-operation agreements and declarations could be 
made amongst EAS member states as confidence-building measures. The EAS could 
more fundamentally model itself as a multilateral consultation mechanism involving East 
Asian countries and the region‘s principal stakeholders to discuss a broad range of key 
issues and challenges facing the East Asian community. Thus, it could discuss a number 
of new security issues and also include the US, EU, Russia, and perhaps others.  
 
Certain incumbent EAS members may not agree with such a proposed role for the East 
Asia Summit, or with the suggested division of labor arrangement with APT. India has 
already signed or will sign FTAs with various East Asian countries and its micro-level 
regionalization links with East Asia continue to strengthen. Its case for being considered 
an integral member of an emerging East Asian community is expected to strengthen in 
forthcoming years, and India will therefore wish to be party to any substantive East Asian 
regional  integration  agreements  that  might  arise  in  the  future.  For  earlier-stated 
geopolitical reasons, Japan and other East Asian countries will support India‘s inclusion 
in this process to counterbalance an ascendant PRC. Australia and New Zealand, which 
also have a number of FTA links with East Asian countries, will also most likely try to 
make the same case as India for full inclusion in East Asia‘s regional community building 
endeavors. The division of labor arrangements between EAS and APT might therefore 
become problematic, and it may take a few years to determine an appropriate functional 
relationship  between  these  two  regional  frameworks.  Just  as  with  APT,  the  EAS 
progress  generally  depends  on  the  PRC  and  Japan  agreeing  on  how  to  approach 
higher-order integration issues, such as participation in a regional FTA.  
 
Another challenge for the EAS is how to reconcile Australia‘s proposal for creating an 
Asia–Pacific Community (APC) with a Japanese proposal for essentially converting the 
EAS  into  a  formal  East  Asian  Community  (EAC).  The  APC  was  first  proposed  by 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in June 2008 and its purpose thus far stated would 
be to rationalize existing Asia–Pacific level institutions rather than create a new one—
thus at least implicitly suggesting it would supersede APEC and in doing so create a 
forum for discussing a wide range of regional issues. Japan‘s EAC proposal was made 
in  2009  and  based  on  similar  generalized  conceptions  as  the  APC.  Both  regional 
community initiatives were tabled for discussion at the October 2009 EAS summit, but 
there appeared to have been no prior co-ordination or communication between Japan 
and Australia regarding their respective proposals. This was somewhat odd given the 
aforementioned long history of the Japan– Australia partnership in Pacific community 
building, and moreover presents them as competing ideas in the future development of 
regional  architecture  (Acharya  2009).  Certainly,  any  emergent  EAC  based  on  an 
expanded EAS stakeholder membership that included the US would present a distinct 
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4.   Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
 
4.1   Origins and Early Development 
 
The ASEAN group and the EU have been dialogue partners since 1972; this being one 
of the earliest inter-regional relationships formed in the modern era. The idea of creating 
ASEM conceived a broader kind of relationship and was proposed by Singapore‘s Prime 
Minister,  Goh  Chok  Tong,  in  October  1994.  By  1995,  a  date  had  been  set  for  the 
inaugural summit, which took place at Bangkok in March 1996. ASEM is essentially an 
inter-regional dialogue framework between the EU and a core of East Asian states. The 
original  Asian  members  of  ASEM  were  the  PRC,  Japan,  Korea  and  seven  ASEAN 
countries  (Brunei  Darussalam,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam). Its work on fostering closer inter-regional relations between 
Europe and Asia rests on three pillars: economic, political and socio-cultural.  
 
The creation of ASEM was part of a wider global trend of the emerging inter-regionalism 
of the post-Cold War world order of the 1990s. This order, though, was being generally 
reconstituted  along  tripolar-structured  lines,  and  ASEM  itself  was  a  product  of  this 
(Bridges  1999,  Dent  2001,  Hanggi  1999).  By  the  early  1990s,  three  prosperous 
regions—North  America,  East  Asia,  and  Europe—had  come  to  dominate  the  world 
economic system, marking a relative global shift from geopolitics to geo-economics, and 
from  communist–capitalist  bipolarity  to  inter-capitalist  tripolarity.  The  extent  of  triadic 
economic dominance remains extreme: between them, the EU, East Asia, and North 
America account for 80%–95% of global production, trade, finance, foreign investment, 
and new technology development. As the 1990s progressed, tripolar relations moved 
beyond basic concerns  regarding inter-triad power  competition to focus more on co-
operative initiatives.  
 
The US more proactive approach towards APEC during the mid-1990s—especially the 
launch of the organization‘s Bogor Goals to establish free trade and investment in the 
Asia–Pacific by 2010/202—helped spur the EU into action to strengthen its triadic links. 
A year later, the US and EU established a new trans-Atlantic framework of relations 
under the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). Both of these sets of inter-regional ties were 
already quite strong  and in the trans-Pacific case increasingly dynamic. The Eurasian 
link of the triangle by comparison was relatively weak. Thus, the perceived need for 
ASEM primarily arose within this global-tripolar context. More specifically, the EU‘s main 
motivations for promoting ASEM lay in its anxieties over the prospect of potential geo-
economic  marginalization  in  a  trans-Pacific  dominated  world  economy.  The  EU‘s 
introduction of its New Asia Strategy in 1994 signaled Europe‘s intentions to redress the 
triadic imbalance.  
 
As a regional collective, East Asia‘s own motivations for promoting ASEM were mostly 
different,  but  still  deemed  equally  critical  for  the  region.  First,  the  EU‘s  more  active 
engagement in East Asia would help counter-balance American influence in the region, 
in particular, and that of the other great powers—Japan, the PRC, Russia—in general. 
Second, ASEM would help East Asian states diversify their international relations in a 
globalizing  world.  This  was  especially  a  priority  to  those  with  perceived  over- 
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dependencies upon the US and Japan, in terms of markets, capital, and technology, 
among others. Third, there was a general feeling that East Asian states and firms had 
under-explored  the  commercial  opportunities  that  EU  regional  integration  presented, 
especially  after  the  creation  of  the  Single  European  Market.  There  were,  of  course, 
common motivations shared by East Asia and the EU for promoting ASEM. The new 
inter-regional  diplomacy  mechanism  could  potentially  act  to  counter  the  excessive 
hegemonic  behavior  of  the  US,  and  both  had  an  ultimate  interest  in  fortifying  the 
―weakest  link‖  in  the  tripolar  structure  of  relations  for  the  balance  it  would  bring  to 
international relations in general. To many, ASEM was also an important exercise in 
international community building in more general terms by the inter-regional linkage it 
forged between two large and populous regions.  
 
The main thrust of the ASEM process comes from its biennial summits, starting with the 
inaugural ASEM 1 held in Bangkok in March 1996. Subsequent summits were organized 
in London (ASEM 2, 1998), Seoul (ASEM 3, 2000), Copenhagen (ASEM 4, 2002), Hanoi 
(ASEM 5,  2004), Helsinki (ASEM 6,  2006), and Beijing (ASEM 7,  2008).  Over  time, 
ASEM‘s  membership  has  expanded  to  from  its  original  25  member  countries  to  43 
members. This has been the result of the EU‘s own expansion from 15 to 27 member 
states  over  the  period  and  the  accession  of  Cambodia,  Lao  PDR,  Myanmar,  India, 
Pakistan, and Mongolia, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat and European Commission, 
as  formal  members.
29  The  enlargement  of  ASEM  is  conducted  on  the  basis  of 
consensus  by  its  incumbent  members‘  heads  of  state  or  government.  Australia  and 
Russia will become new ASEM members at the ASEM 8 summit in October 2010. 
 
4.2   Issue Coverage, Agenda Setting, and Instrumentalization 
 
ASEM‘s  agenda  is  broadly  determined  by  its  three  thematic  pillars  of  co-operation: 
economic, political and socio-cultural. Hence, it has a similar policy scope as APT and 
EAS, but formally extends beyond the primary economic focus of APEC. However, as 
ASEM  is  essentially  an  informal  dialogue  process,  its  capacity  to  make  substantive 
progress on co-operation is rather limited. Nevertheless, it has increasingly taken on a 
number of global issues, including 
 
(i)  arms control, disarmament, and weapons of mass destruction; 
(ii)  welfare of women and children; 
(iii)  human resources development and education; 
(iv)  inter-faith dialogues; 
(v)  health; 
(vi)  food security; 
(vii)  energy security; 
(viii)  environment and sustainable development; 
(ix)  migratory flows; 
(x)  transnational crime and counter-terrorism; 
(xi)  globalization; and, 
(xii)  human rights. 
                                                           
29 With the addition of these two organisations, ASEM technically has 45 members.  
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At  the  ASEM-6  Summit  held  in  Helsinki  in  2006,  ASEM  partners  stated  their  firmer 
commitment to tackle global issues and make more substantive contributions to global 
multilateral  co-operation.  ASEM  works  alongside  organizations  such  as  the  United 
Nations,  WTO,  IMF,  and  World  Bank,  as  well  as  other  regional  and  inter-regional 
organizations (e.g., APEC and the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation) that 
aim to make similar contributions. In order to help operationalize ASEM‘s agenda and 
work programs, the Asia–Europe Co-operation Framework (AECF) was first introduced 
at the 1998 ASEM 2 summit and then revised in 2000. The AECF states that the ASEM 
process should 
 
(i)  promote  dialogue  that  leads  to  co-operation  on  the  identification  of 
priorities for concerted and supportive action; 
(ii)  pursue  actions  and  dialogues  under  ASEM‘s  three  pillars  with  equal 
impetus in fostering political dialogue, reinforcing economic co-operation, 
and promoting co-operation in socio-cultural areas; 
(iii)  stimulate  and facilitate progress  in  other fora,  although  it  need  not  be 
institutionalized; and, 
(iv)  encourage dialogue and co-operation between the business sectors and 
peoples of Asia and Europe.  
 
To date, ASEM has not launched any real grand-scale initiative or program on inter-
regional co-operation or integration to capture the public‘s attention. It has maintained a 
relatively low level of institutionalized co-operation on certain technical programs. While 
the introduction of the AECF has established some basis for the underlying principles, 
objectives, and priorities of Asia–Europe inter-regional co-operation, ASEM lacks any 
rule-making  capacity  and  generally  possesses  weak  institutional  capacity.  While  this 
remains the case, ASEM will continue to be an informal, consultative, and essentially 
non-binding process.  
 
4.3   Organizational Structure and Institutional Processes 
 
To  date,  ASEM  remains  an  informal  process  of  multi-structured  dialogue  between  a 
growing number of Asian states and the EU. The biennial summits represents the apex 
of ASEM‘s organizational structure, and Figure 3 illustrates the three pillars of ASEM 
that form the main sub-structural basis of the framework. The economic pillar is by far 
the most developed and substantive, given that economics forms the most significant 
lowest common denominator between the two regions. Establishing common positions 
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There  are  Foreign,  Economic,  Financial,  Cultural,  Education,  and  Environment 
Ministerial Meetings that occur according to varying periods of regularity. Since 2006, a 
number  of  ASEM  Ministerial  Conferences  have  been  held  to  discuss  specific  issues 
beyond regular ministerial meetings. Thus far, the following such conferences have been 
convened: Labor and Employment (September 2006), Information and Communications 
Technology (November/December 2006), SMEs (October 2007), Energy Security (June 
2009),  Transport  (October  2009).  These  have  served  as  ad  hoc  quasi-ministerial 
meetings, mirroring many of the new policy areas covered by APT, EAS, and APEC, 
suggesting that a cross-institutional learning process is taking place. Meetings at the 
ministerial  level  are  similarly  supported  by  those  at  a  senior  official  level.  The  main 
Senior  Officials  Meeting  (SOM)  specifically  supports  the  ASEM  Foreign  Ministers 
Meeting,  while  a  Senior  Officials  Meeting  on  Trade  and  Investment  (SOMTI)  has 
operated since 1996 and reports to the ASEM Economic Ministers Meeting. Elsewhere, 
ASEM Officials Meetings are convened in the fields of finance and customs.  
 
There is no ASEM Secretariat, as the foreign ministers and their senior officials perform 
the main co-ordinating role in the ASEM process. They are assisted by a rotating group 
of  co-ordinators,  or  shepherds,  with  two  countries  from  the  Asian  side  and  the  EU 
Presidency and the European Commission representing the EU side. At the Helsinki 
2006  summit,  it  was  decided  that  an  ASEM  Virtual  Secretariat  would  be  created  to 
operate as a closed intranet system to more effectively manage ASEM‘s agenda and 
work programs, as well as to enhance institutional memory within ASEM processes.  
 
The  Asia–Europe  Foundation  (ASEF)  is  ASEM‘s  only  formal  institution.  Based  in 
Singapore  with  45  staff,
30  its  prime  function  is  to  promote  and  facilitate  cultural, 
intellectual, and general people-to-people exchanges between Asia and Europe, and is a 
key socializing agent within the ASEM framework. ASEF‘s mandate is derived from the 
so-called  Dublin  Principles  legal framework  document,  which  was  first established  in 
December 1996 and last updated in October 2007 (ASEF 2007). ASEF (i) is financed 
through  an  operating  fund  and  an  endowment  fund,  (ii)  has  legal  status  as  an 
incorporated company limited by guarantee under Singapore law, and (iii) is governed by 
a Board of Governors headed by alternating European and Asian chairpersons. Three 
ASEF Board meetings are held per year. Over the years, ASEM members have charged 
ASEF with developing a number of initiatives, including a dialogue program on Human 
Rights  and  Governance  (from  the  1
st  Foreign  Ministers  Meeting  held  in  Singapore, 
1997); an ASEM Education Hub (2
nd ASEM summit, London 1998); a Culture360 (1
st 
Cultures Ministers Meeting, Beijing 2003); and a Public Health Network Program (6
th 
ASEM  summit,  Helsinki  2006).  In  return,  ASEF  makes  a  number  of  significant 
contributions to the ASEM process in terms of raising its public awareness through its 
various socialization programs and engaging with public media. The Foundation also 
channels the numerous policy recommendations arising out its social group activities to 
participants  at  ASEM‘s  Senior  Officials,  Ministers,  and  Summit  Meetings.  One  such 
recent  example  being  the  Connecting  Civil  Society  initiative  at  ASEM-7  in  Beijing  in 
2008, as well as the idea of creating an Education Ministers Meeting process and ASEM 
Inter-Faith Dialogue. 
 
                                                           
30 Of these, 30 are permanent with staff coming from 17 countries.  
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The Asia–Europe Business Forum (AEBF) is a key element of ASEM‘s organizational 
structure. AEBF was created at the inception of the summit process in 1996 and as with 
its  equivalents  in  APT  and  APEC,  it  provides  a  forum  for  business  dialogue,  a 
mechanism for the business community‘s views and recommendations to be channeled 
into the decision-making process, and a means for strengthening trade and investment 
relations  amongst  member  countries.  At  the  ASEM-3  summit  in  Seoul  in  2000,  the 
Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN) was established to foster network linkages 
amongst the academic and research institute communities of Asia and Europe,  thus 
promoting greater intellectual exchanges and collaborations between the two regions. 
An additional part of TEIN‘s work is to expand and diversify speedier and more powerful 
inter-regional telecommunication connections. 
 
The two main Working Groups of ASEM—both of which are positioned in its economic 
pillar—are  the  Trade  Facilitation  Action  Plan  (TFAP)  and  the  Investment  Promotion 
Action Plan (IPAP). The TFAP comprises trade officials and business representatives 
(mainly via the AEBF) that examine ways to promote mutual trade opportunities, while 
also considering bilateral and multilateral matters pertinent to Asia–Europe inter-regional 
relations.  Thus  far  most  its  work  has  focused  on  industrial  standards,  testing, 
certification,  accreditation  and  technical  regulations,  the  mobility  of  business  people, 
customs procedures, public procurement, intellectual property rights (IPR), quarantine, 
and  sanitary/phyto-sanitary  procedures.  The  IPAP  meanwhile  consists  of  public  and 
private sector representatives to consider how to promote inter-regional FDI flows. Broad 
areas covered include investment policies and regulations, standards and certification, 
financial support, technology transfer and skills development, environmental issues. A 
third Working Group on Customs Co-operation undertakes work commissioned by the 
aforementioned ASEM Officials Meeting on customs matters, with particular attention 
given to simplifying and harmonizing customs procedures. All of these working groups 
were established in 1996 and their outcomes are overseen and reviewed by SOMTI. 
ASEM‘s  work  is  further  augmented  by  a  number  of  specific  initiatives,  including  the 
ASEM  Trust  Fund  (set  up  in  1998  to  assist  East  Asia‘s  post-crisis  restructuring), 
European  Financial  Expertise  Network  (established  in  1998),  ASEM  Child  Welfare, 
ASEM  Connect  (networking  small  firms  from  East  Asia  and  the  EU),  and  various 
seminars on literature, music, and the environment.  
 
4.4   Impacts and Key Issues for the Future 
 
The ASEM inter-regional framework was forged amid the emerging geopolitics of the 
post-Cold War period, when there was much debate on the global structural shift from 
bipolarity to tripolarity founded on the three dominant economic regions of East Asia, 
Europe, and North America. By cementing the inter-regional link between Europe and 
East Asia, ASEM was broadly seen as providing balance in this tripolar structure. As 
time has progressed, it has increasingly contributed to and focused on matters of global 
governance.  In  this  sense,  ASEM‘s  multilateral  utility  function  has  gradually 
strengthened (Dent 2004). However, as with other large regional-based arrangements 
involving East  Asian countries (e.g., APEC, EAS), ASEM‘s large number  of member 
states  means  that  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  it  producing  any  deep  integrational 
agreements in the future as there are too many diverse national and societal interests to 
reconcile.  This  primarily  explains  why  ASEM‘s  ambitions  have  remained  to  simply  
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expand  its  dialogue  agenda  and  socialization  mechanisms  to  cover  an  increasing 
number  of  global  and  inter-regional  issues.  In  turn,  this  also  explains  why  ASEM‘s 
institutional structure has been extended to manage new processes of dialogue, but not 
much beyond this since it was created in 1996.  
 
The continued significance of Asia to Europe, and Europe to Asia, will mean that ASEM 
will continue to be valued as an important inter-regional dialogue process that deepens 
inter-regional understandings and occasionally yields some level of useful co-operation 
(e.g., ASEM Trust Fund). This value on these terms will increase the more that ASEM 
expands  its  membership,  while  at  the  same  time  being  able  to  continue  expanding 
effective dialogue processes. Yet, as with most such international dialogue frameworks, 
ASEM  will  also  continue  to  attract  criticism  from  some  for  emphasizing  talk  over 
substantive action on inter-regional co-operation. To counter this criticism, ASEM should 
further  develop  its  multilateral  utility  potential  by  making  increasingly  valuable  Asia–
Europe contributions to the strengthening of global governance structures, and by more 




5.   Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
 
5.1   Origins and Early Development 
 
As mentioned at  the start of the paper, APEC arose from the culmination of Pacific 
regional  community  building  endeavors  that  can  be  traced  back  to  the  1960s.  Its 
antecedent organizations—PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC—laid the foundation for APEC‘s 
establishment  in  1989  by  sustaining  various  levels  of  trans-regional  dialogue  on 
strengthening economic and business ties within the Asia–Pacific. Japan and Australia 
were especially instrumental in this process as partner standard bearers of the Pacific 
community  ideal.  Although  the  US  was  showing  more  interest  in  Pacific  community 
building ventures by the late 1970s and early 1980s, it still eschewed regionalism in 
strategic diplomacy terms, preferring instead multilateralism on the trade liberalization 
front  through  GATT  negotiations  in  tandem  with  maintaining  strong  bilateral  alliance 
relationships with key economic and security partners (Ravenhill 2001). The persistence 
of  Cold War  divisions  during  the  1980s  meant  that  the  PRC  and  other  communist–
socialist countries in East Asia (e.g., Viet Nam) were excluded from any Pacific regional 
community building process as led by the trans-region‘s capitalist states. Meanwhile, 
Korea  and  Taipei,China  were  still  only  newly  industrializing  economies  in  the  close 
bilateral economic and security embrace of the US. Many East Asian nations were also 
highly circumspect of any Japan-led regional initiative given lingering memories of the 
country‘s aggressive imperialism exercised in the early 20
th century.  
 
Both Japan and the US had the problem of many other smaller states fearing that these 
two  economic  giants  would  dominate  any  trans-Pacific  regional  organization  that 
emerged. With this in mind, it became politically more expedient for Australia to take a 
higher profile in new Pacific diplomacy initiatives relative to Japan. It was, therefore, 
Australia that officially proposed the creation of APEC in 1989, the inaugural ministerial 
meeting being held in Canberra in November of that year with significant financial and  
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technocratic  support  provided  from  Japan.  By  the  late  1980s,  various  events  and 
developments were conspiring to make other Asia–Pacific nations more interested in 
joining a Pacific regional organization. Ravenhill (2001) neatly summarized these as ―a 
significant surge in US unilateralism, the agricultural trade war between Washington and 
Brussels, the conclusion of negotiations between the US and Canada to establish a free 
trade area, the move towards a single internal market in the European Community, and 
deadlock in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks.‖ In addition, the launch of APEC—the 
most  substantial  inter-governmental  arrangement  proposed  at  the  time—was  the 
culmination of 3 decades of discussions on how to better promote and organize closer 
regional economic relations in the Pacific (Garnaut 2000, Ravenhill 2002a). 
 
At  the  inaugural  Canberra  Ministerial  Meeting, the  Australian  Government‘s  proposal 
that  APEC  be  modeled  on  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development (OECD) was coolly received by East Asian member countries, most of 
which  preferred  a  looser,  less-institutionalized,  consensus-building  arrangement 
(Drysdale  1991,  Garnaut  2000).  It  was  this  latter  approach  that  prevailed  in  the 
organizational construction of APEC, and hence European-style, treaty-driven regional 
integration was also to be avoided. Rather, APEC would foster closer economic relations 
on  a  trans-regional  scale  through  inter-governmental  consultations  and  other  non-
binding mechanisms. East Asia‘s developing economy members, in particular, had an 
obvious interest  in APEC‘s  work on economic and technical co-operation (―ecotech‖) 
programs. Japan also wanted the organization to have a substantive regional economic 
co-operation  agenda,  which  it  believed  would  complement  the  country‘s  own 
development  aid  strategy  at  work  in  East  Asia.  Some  ASEAN  countries  were 
nevertheless concerned over APEC‘s impact on Southeast Asian regionalist initiatives, 
especially AFTA. Subsequently, they agreed to participate subject to the ―Three No‘s‖: 
APEC would (i) have no legal binding authority, (ii) have no negotiating rights, and (iii) 
pursue no regional agreements beyond those permitted under GATT and WTO trade 
rules.  
 
There were 12 original member countries in attendance at the 1989 Canberra Ministerial 
Meeting:  Japan,  Korea,  Brunei  Darussalam,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It was Japan, rather 
than Australia, that insisted on the US being invited to the inaugural Canberra meeting. 
Japan‘s motives lay in the desire to contain American unilateralism on trade affairs by 
incorporating the US in multilateral fora like APEC (Hayashi 2006, Krauss 2000). It was 
also a means of keeping the US engaged in the region as the Cold War appeared to be 
drawing to a close. At Canberra, attending foreign and economic ministers agreed that 
APEC‘s  basic  objectives  should  be  to  promote  regional  economic  growth  and 
development, and uphold an open multilateral trading system. Thus, there would be no 
recourse to building a Pacific trade bloc, but rather to foster a constructive economic 
interdependence between members. Ministerial meetings were also to be held annually, 
while regular and intermediate SOMs would oversee and co-ordinate, with ministerial 
approval, APEC‘s work in progress between Ministers Meetings. Key developments in 
the three subsequent APEC Ministerial Meetings were as follows: 
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(i)  Second  APEC  Ministerial  Meeting  (Singapore,  July  1990).  Seven 
Working  Groups  were  created  to  enhance  co-operation  in  trade 
promotion,  technology  transfer,  human  resource  development,  energy, 
telecommunications,  marine  resources,  and  the  collection  of  regional 
economic  data.  Later  on,  three  more  Working  Groups  (transportation, 
tourism, and fisheries) were added to the framework.  
(ii)  Third APEC Ministerial Meeting (Seoul, November 1991). The PRC; 
Hong  Kong,  China;  and  Taipei,China  were  admitted  as  new  member 
economies.  APEC‘s  scope  of  activities  and  general  objectives  were 
further defined as the (a) exchange of information and consultation on 
policies relevant to common efforts to sustain growth, (b) adjustment and 
reduction of economic disparities, (c) development of strategies to reduce 
impediments  to  trade  and  investment,  and  (d)  promotion  of  objectives 
specifically set within APEC‘s Working Groups.  
(iii)  Fourth  APEC  Ministerial  Meeting  (Bangkok,  September  1992). 
Participants  agreed to establish a permanent APEC Secretariat, which 
was later implemented in January 1993 and based in Singapore. It was 
also  decided  to  create  an  Eminent  Persons  Group  (EPG)  that  would 
produce ―future vision‖ reports on how APEC should progress, especially 
with respect to advancing regional trade liberalization. 
 
Most observers agree that APEC made a reasonably solid start in its first four Ministerial 
Meetings (Garnaut 2000, Okamoto 2004, Ravenhill 2001, Ruland et al 2002). The profile 
of APEC was to be raised further still as a result of the more ambitious agenda that was 
set during the 1993/94 period of the organization‘s development. A number of critical 
factors converged to make the Fifth APEC Ministerial Meeting, convened in Seattle in 
November 1993, a landmark event. To start with, it was accompanied by the inaugural 
APEC  Economic  Leaders  Meeting,  held  nearby  at  Blake  Island  that  was  the  first  of 
subsequent  annually-held  APEC  summits  to  run  parallel  to  the  Ministerial  Meeting 
process. Virtually all the member heads of state attended the first summit, helping raise 
APEC to a new level of politico– diplomatic significance. At both APEC meetings, the 
EPG‘s  first  report  entitled  A  Vision  for  APEC—Towards  an  Asia–Pacific  Economic 
Community  was  tabled  for  discussion.  In  the  report,  the  EPG  recommended  that  a 
program of trade and investment liberalization measures be collectively implemented by 
member  economies  (APEC  1993).  This  was  a  prelude  for  the  more  defined  and 
ambitious EPG second report tabled at the following year‘s meetings. The first EPG 
report was accepted, but with reservations from many East Asian states who saw this as 
a  departure  from  APEC‘s  original  aims  of  promoting  informal  economic  co-operation 
rather than commercial liberalization. However, the US‘s strong advocacy for APEC to 
substantively adopt the latter as a key objective led to ambitious new targets being set at 
the following year‘s Ministerial Meeting and Leaders‘ Meeting hosted by Indonesia. 
 
At the 1994 APEC summit in Bogor, Indonesia, leaders endorsed the proposals outlined 
in the EPG‘s second report for establishing free and open trade and investment within 
the Asia–Pacific by the two-stage deadlines of 2010 and 2020 (APEC 1994).  Developed   
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member  economies  were  to  realize  this  objective  by  the  former  date,  while  the 
developing members were given until the latter. These became known as the Bogor 
Goals, which were named after the location of the Leaders‘ Meeting that year and were 
to be achieved in accordance with the principle of open regionalism. This implied that 
APEC members were to open up their economies in a unilateral and non-discriminatory 
manner, not just to each other but also to non-members, thus complying with the most 
favored nation (MFN) principles on which WTO liberalization was based. However, by 
late 2009 there was still no agreement or established understanding within APEC as to 
which member economies qualified as developed and which as developing, and thus 
which member economies were supposed to adhere for the 2010 target deadline as 
opposed  to the  2020  deadline.  No  evaluation  criteria  had been  established  to judge 
whether developed member economies, which ever they may be, met the 2010 deadline 
target on trade and investment liberalization. By late 2009 there was also no clarification 
on whether a 1 January or 31 December date applied to the 2010 deadline. Although in 
the  2005  Bogor  Goals  Mid-Term  Stocktake  document  (APEC  2005)  Australia, 
Singapore, and Chile indicated their intentions to meet the 2010 deadline, APEC missed 
the opportunity provided by this stocktake to establish clarification on all of the above 
points. Given that the Bogor Goals have remained APEC‘s flagship project since their 
launch in 1994,  it is highly problematic that these fundamental issues had not been 
resolved by the first deadline year of 2010.
31 
 
By the late 1990s, APEC‘s membership had grown to 21 economies from around the 
trans-region,  with  newer  members  including  Russia,  Peru,  Chile,  and  Viet  Nam.  A 
moratorium was placed on membership expansion until the first Bogor Goal deadline of 
2010.  Prospective  new  members  include  Columbia,  Ecuador,  Mongolia,  Lao  PDR, 
Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  and  India.  It  could  be  argued  that  the  last  five  of  these  are 
ineligible for APEC membership as they lack both a Pacific coastline and any form or 
history of Pacific identity, even though they may be able to demonstrate close economic, 
socio-cultural, or political linkages with the Asia–Pacific trans-region core. This brings us 
back  to  the  debate  over  variable  geography.  While  membership  eligibility  criteria 
established in 1997 stated that prospective members must be located in the Asia–Pacific 
region, APEC has never defined this in any exact geographic terms. 
 
5.2   Issue Coverage, Agenda Setting, and Instrumentalization 
 
5.2.1   The Primacy of Commercial Liberalization 
 
APEC‘s stated primary goal is to promote sustainable economic growth and prosperity in 
the Asia–Pacific. APEC aims to achieve this through ―championing free and open trade 
and investment, promoting and accelerating regional economic integration, encouraging 
economic  and  technical  co-operation,  enhancing  human  security,  and  facilitating  a 
favorable and sustainable business environment.‖
32 The organization‘s agenda is based 
on  three  broad  areas  or  pillars:  (i)  trade  and  investment  liberalization,  (ii)  business 
facilitation, and (iii) economic and technical co-operation (ecotech). As the organization‘s 
                                                           
31 During a research interview in Singapore in September 2009, an APEC Secretariat official conceded 
that APEC has a credibility problem over this lack of clarity on implementing the Bogor Goals.   
32 Taken from the APEC website‘s (http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec/mission_statement.html).  
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principal objective is to realize free trade and investment in the Asia–Pacific by the split 
deadlines of 2010 and 2020, work areas (ii) and (iii) are ultimately subordinated to the 
aims of trade and investment (i.e., commercial) liberalization. Moreover, the proclaimed 
benefits that APEC is supposed to bring to its member economies are stated in terms of 
those normally associated with free trade, including cheaper products, wider consumer 
choice, and economic efficiency. 
 
Although  the  Bogor  Goals  on  trade  and  investment  liberalization  have  remained  the 
organization‘s flagship project, from the very beginning there were apparent differences 
of opinion between East Asian countries on the one side and Anglo–Pacific countries on 
the other regarding APEC‘s modus operandi of implementing the Bogor Goals. Firstly, 
considerable ambiguity existed over the exact meaning of open regionalism. After the 
dissolution of the EPG that he once chaired, Fred Bergsten (1996) argued that non-
discriminatory free trade was neither practical nor desirable because it conferred APEC 
with no leverage in global trade negotiations. Bergsten (1994) had even earlier argued 
that pursuing a ―temporary conditional‖ MFN approach, whereby APEC applies pressure 
to secure reciprocal tariff concessions from non-APEC trading partners, would serve as 
a solution to this problem. The specific reciprocity terms and modalities that Bergsten 
was  advocating  would  also  require  APEC  members  to  agree  to  more  definitive 
commitments  on  implementing  trade  and  investment  liberalization.  Ravenhill  (2001) 
notes  that  East  Asian  countries  were  already  arguing  the  counter-case  for  greater 
flexibility  to  apply,  both  in  terms  of  what  was  implied  by  trade  and  investment 
liberalization, and the means by which it was to be realized. For example, many ASEAN 
member states believed that AFTA‘s targets of reducing tariff rates to the 0%–5% range 
should  be  the  benchmark  for  meeting  their  Bogor  Goal  objectives.  At  the  ASEAN 
Economic  Ministers  Meeting  held  in  Chiang  Mai  in  September  1994,  the  general 
consensus was that the EPG‘s second report recommendations on trade liberalization 
were too specific.  
 
In the lead up to the 1995 Osaka APEC Summit, most East Asian members had become 
increasingly wary of the EPG‘s advocacy of commercial liberalization becoming the core 
of APEC‘s agenda. Many of the recommendations made in the EPG‘s third and final 
report (APEC 1995a), such as on anti-dumping policies, were rejected largely due to 
opposition expressed by East Asian members. Nevertheless, it was agreed that trade 
and investment liberalization was to progress by each APEC member state preparing 
their own individual action plans (IAPs) on meeting Bogor Goal objectives. This was the 
core  basis  of  the  Osaka  Action  Plan  (APEC  1995b).  First,  draft  IAPs  were  to  be 
submitted at the following year‘s summit in Manila and implemented from the beginning 
of 1997.  
 
Each IAP covers 15 issue areas,
33 with a principal emphasis on trade and investment 
(i.e., commercial) liberalization. Member economies were obliged to submit these IAPs 
on an annual basis. Every few years, a member‘s IAP is peer reviewed by a panel of 
experts from other member economies. Although there were agreed-upon guidelines on 
                                                           
33 Tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, 
intellectual  property,  competition  policy,  government  procurement,  deregulation–regulatory  review, 
WTO  obligations  (including  rules  of  origin),  dispute  mediation,  mobility  of  business  people,  and 
information gathering and analysis.  
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the formulation of IAPs, these were very general and it was left up to each member state 
to determine the programmatic content of their plans. Moreover, the actions laid out in 
IAPs are undertaken in a voluntary and non-binding basis. The IAPs were to run in 
parallel with a series of collective action plans on commercial liberalization that together 
formed the basis of the overarching Manila Action Plan (MAPA), which consisted of six 
main areas of work: (i) greater market access in goods, (ii) enhanced market access in 
services, (iii) an open investment regime, (iv) reduced business costs, (v) an open and 
efficient  infrastructure  sector,  and  (vi)  strengthened  economic  and  technical  co-
operation. Many East Asian states were unhappy with the fact that ecotech appeared to 
be bolted on at the end of this list.  
 
  5.2.2   From IAPs to Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) 
 
The IAP process was APEC‘s first modus operandi on trade liberalization, often referred 
to as concerted unilateral liberalization. However, in practice many East Asian member 
states had dragged their feet on either initiating their IAP commitments or incorporating 
substantive  liberalization  measures  and  targets  in  their  plans  (Soesastro  1999). 
Furthermore, Petri (1997) observed that the IAPs were generally speaking ―vague on 
overall goals and short on specifics.‖ Meanwhile, East Asian countries were pressing for 
a higher priority to be afforded to APEC‘s ecotech agenda. Some success was achieved 
here. The number of ecotech initiatives was growing and at the Osaka Summit it was 
agreed  that  ecotech  should  be  conferred  equal  status  with  trade  and  investment 
liberalization. However, the actual substance of ecotech initiatives remained thin and in 
reality  commercial  liberalization  continued  to  dominate  the  APEC  agenda  (Ravenhill 
2001). 
 
With slow progress being made on the IAP front, APEC‘s most ardent pro-liberalizing 
member states supported a new initiative tabled by the US at the 1997 APEC Summit 
held in Vancouver. This was the early voluntary sectoral liberalization (EVSL) scheme in 
which  15  specific  industry  sectors  were  targeted  for  accelerated,  or  fast  track, 
liberalization that would, it was hoped, catalyze a broader trade liberalization process. 
Member governments were asked beforehand at the May 1997 APEC Trade Ministers 
Meeting to nominate sectors they wished to be included in the scheme, which was to 
also comprise various facilitation and ecotech measures. In some sectors (e.g., telecoms 
and automotive), emphasis was placed on the mutual recognition of standards rather 
than eliminating tariffs.  
 
Of the 15 chosen sectors, nine were conferred high priority and placed in the first tier 
(chemicals, rubbers, and plastics; energy; environmental goods and services; forestry 
products; fisheries; gems and jewellery; medical equipment and instruments; telecoms; 
and toys), and the other seven (automotive, civil aircraft, fertilizers, food, natural and 
synthetic rubber, oilseeds and oilseed products) in the second tier. Essentially, first tier 
sectors were to liberalize at a more accelerated pace than second tier sectors. However, 
the  EVSL  was  beset  with  disagreements  arising  over  the  perceived  nature  of  the 
scheme and how it was to be operationalized. This especially related to interpretations of 
its voluntary aspect. For Anglo–Pacific member governments in particular, this implied 
that APEC members had voluntarily nominated sectors and had voluntarily decided to 
support the scheme as a whole. Some member governments, especially those from East  
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Asia,  were  of  the  understanding  that  the  ―V‖  in  EVSL  implied  there  was  scope  for 
concentrating  on  certain  sectors  or  sector-specific  elements  (e.g.,  ecotech  over 
liberalization) rather than others, or in how and when the scheme‘s targets were to be 
realized.  
 
It  had  become  clear  by  the  June  1998  APEC  Trade  Ministers  Meeting  hosted  by 
Malaysia in Kuching that the planned official launch of the EVSL at the Kuala Lumpur 
summit  later  the  year  was  going  to  be  problematic.  The  Japanese  government  was 
refusing to accept the EVSL as a complete  package, insisting upon an opt-out from 
liberalizing its fisheries and forestry sector. Agriculture was an extremely sensitive area 
in  Japan‘s  domestic  political  economy,  and  the  country‘s  trade  negotiators  enjoyed 
strong public and lobby group support back home on this matter. Japan came under 
considerable pressure from the US and other pro-liberalization member governments, 
but Tokyo refused to yield. Other East Asian member states—most notably the PRC; 
Korea;  and  Taipei,China—tacitly  supported  Japan‘s  veto,  as  agricultural  trade 
liberalization was a politically sensitive issue for them also (Krauss 2004, Rapkin 2001, 
Ravenhill 2001). At the 1998 APEC Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand also chose not to support the EVSL scheme. Unable to broker a resolution 
within APEC, the matter was referred to the WTO for possible inclusion in the then-
named New Millennium Round agenda for global trade talks, due to be launched at the 
WTO‘s Seattle Ministerial Meeting in December 1999. As a result of largely East Asian 
opposition, this second APEC strategy of advancing towards the Bogor Goals had also 
failed.  Furthermore,  there  was  mounting  frustration  amongst  East  Asian  countries 
concerning APEC‘s failure as an organization to address the fallout from the region‘s 
1997/98 financial crisis (Okamoto 2004, Ruland et al. 2002).  
 
5.2.3   The New FTA Challenge 
 
After the EVSL debacle, APEC struggled to make substantive progress on advancing its 
own  commercial  liberalization  agenda.  At  the  September  1999  APEC  Summit  in 
Auckland, New Zealand, the host government tried in vain to salvage something from 
the EVSL package. By this time, a number of APEC members (mostly East Asian) had 
begun to initiate bilateral FTA projects with each other for the first time. The first wave of 
bilateral  projects  (Korea–Chile,  Japan–Korea,  Thailand–Korea)  had  been  formally 
launched in November 1998, either at or around the same time of the previous year‘s 
Kuala Lumpur summit (Dent 2006). A further four bilaterals were officially proposed at 
the  Auckland  1999  summit  (Singapore–New  Zealand,  Mexico–Singapore,  Japan–
Singapore, Japan–Mexico) and two other projects (Korea–New Zealand, Japan–Chile) 
were initiated throughout that year. This was the start of a rapid expansion of bilateral 
FTA activity in the Asia–Pacific. From 1997 to 2003, the number of initiated FTA projects 
in the trans-region had risen from 12 to 49. By the end of this period, no new post-EVSL 
trade liberalization initiative had been proposed at APEC summits and the IAP scheme 
continued to operate in the same generally ineffective manner. Member governments 
were content in this period simply to make vague pledges in APEC summit declarations 
―to continue and accelerate‖ movement towards the Bogor Goals, as was specifically 
stated at the 2002 APEC Los Cabos Summit declaration.  
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New initiatives on business facilitation and ecotech did little to provide APEC with new 
impetus. At the 2001 summit, the Shanghai Goal on Trade Facilitation was launched 
with its aim of reducing trade transaction costs by 5% by 2006 (APEC 2002). This was 
followed  in  2004  by  a  similar  trade-facilitating  program,  the  Santiago  Initiative  for 
Expanded  Trade,  whereby  APEC  member  states  committed  themselves  to  reduce 
business  transaction  costs  ―by  cutting  red  tape,  embracing  automation,  harmonizing 
standards,  and  eliminating  unnecessary  barriers  to  trade.‖
34  The  very  generalized 
objectives of this program were typical of the non-specific, lowest common denominator 
approach  that  by  this  time  had  become  the  APEC  norm  for  its  new  trans-regional 
initiatives. Furthermore, both the 2001 Shanghai plan and the 2004 Santiago initiative 
had no established baseline on the starting trade facilitation position of APEC member 
economies  and  no  definitions  of  what  was  meant  by  trade  facilitation  or  business 
transaction  costs.
35  This  relates  to  one  of  APEC‘s  main  problems,  namely  that  of 
disaggregation. That is, to what extent can APEC itself claim to have contributed to the 
commercial liberalization and facilitation efforts made by Asia–Pacific economies over 
the  last  20  years?  The  disaggregation  problem  is  discussed  later  in  this  section  on 
APEC. 
 
Countries  such  as  the  US  and  Australia  that  had  been  amongst  the  most  proactive 
member states in APEC during the 1990s were gradually downgrading their view of the 
organization‘s importance during the early 2000s (Beeson 2006, Dent 2008a). The US 
new preoccupation with the ―war on terror‖ after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
switched  its  geopolitical  attention  to  the  Middle  East  and  Central  Asia.  East  Asian 
member  states  were  meanwhile  busy  constructing  new  regional  frameworks  of  co-
operation  through  the  APT  arrangement.  Like  other  APEC  members,  East  Asian 
member states were further developing their FTA policies in this period.  
 
It was at the 2002 APEC Summit held in Los Cabos, Mexico that Asia–Pacific leaders 
first officially acknowledged that APEC needed to more effectively address the impact of 
proliferating  bilateral  FTAs. The  2002  Leader‘s  Declaration  expressed  some  concern 
over the variance of trade rules generated by these bilateral agreements and the need to 
establish  some  consistency  between  them.  More  specifically,  the  2002  Leader‘s 
Declaration called for ―an exchange of views in APEC on regional and bilateral trade 
agreements, noting that these agreements need to be consistent with WTO rules and 
disciplines and APEC‘s goals and principles.‖
36 The following year, PECC‘s Trade Forum 
section  was  commissioned  to  propose  a  code  for  FTA  best  practices,  with  their 
recommendations (PECC 2003) being forwarded to the 2004 APEC Ministerial Meeting 
where  they  were  duly  endorsed  (APEC  2004).  However,  there  were  notable 
inconsistencies between most key areas of FTA best practices being proposed on the 
one hand and what kind of FTAs had been or were being negotiated on the other. For 
example,  many FTAs concluded within the Asia–Pacific did not have comprehensive 
sectoral coverage  as a number of FTAs exempted various agricultural and industrial 
sectors from the agreement. Many agreements also did not have simple rules of origin, 
                                                           
34 Leader‘s Declaration of the 2004 APEC Economic Leaders Summit. 
35 Research interview with APEC Secretariat official, Singapore, September 2009. 
36 Leader‘s Declaration of the 2002 APEC Economic Leaders Summit.  
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but  rather  had  complex  sets  of  product-specific  rules  of  origin  that  often  took  up 
hundreds of pages in the FTA text. A number of other agreements omitted accession 
clauses that would allow third parties to sign the agreement at some later date. Many 
also did not incorporate co-operation provisions in the text.  
 
Furthermore,  the  best  practice  guidelines  did  not  clarify  exactly  how  FTAs  were  to 
achieve the overarching objective of being consistent with APEC principles and goals, 
meaning  inter  alia  the  realization  of  the  Bogor  Goals.  Taking  one  technical  policy 
example  to  illustrate  the  point,  many  FTAs  that  had  been  signed  amongst  APEC 
member  economies  carried  very  long  tariff    liberalization  phase-in  schedules  that 
actually extended beyond the Bogor Goals‘ 2010/2020 deadlines.  
 
At the same time the best FTA practice guidelines were being considered at the 2004 
APEC  Summit  held  in  Santiago,  a  proposal  originating  from  the  APEC  Business 
Advisory Council (ABAC) was tabled to create a Free Trade Area of the Asia–Pacific 
(FTAAP). This was essentially a revival of the old PAFTA idea, and hence could be 
conceived as bringing the whole Pacific regional community building project back to its 
original starting point. The FTAAP proposal was supported by a number  of member 
economies,  including  Chile,  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  the  US,  as  well  as 
Singapore  and  Taipei,China.
37  As  it  transpired,  opposition  from  mostly  East  Asian 
countries (especially the PRC, Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia) scuppered the FTAAP 
proposal  at  the  2004  APEC  Summit,  with  the  opposing  countries  again  noting  their 
preference for APEC to confer greater priority to its ecotech agenda. At the following 
2005 APEC Summit convened in Busan, Korea, a mid-term review on progress towards 
the Bogor Goals was considered (but proposed no new substantive measures on how to 
realize the 2010/2020 commercial liberalization objectives) and the Leaders Declaration 
called for ―the development of model measures for as many commonly accepted FTA 
chapters as possible by 2008.‖
38 The idea of creating an FTAAP re-emerged at the 2006 
APEC  Summit  at  Hanoi,  this  time  being  advocated  by  the  US.  Washington  was 
concerned that East Asia was looking to develop its own regional FTA—the CEPEA—as 
had been earlier proposed by Japan in both April and August of that year. Additionally, 
the US hinted that the FTAAP could be a fall-back plan if the WTO Doha Round of global 
trade  negotiations  collapsed.  Other  pro-liberalizing  member  states  of  APEC  also 
prescribed to this view, as did many ABAC representatives.
39 This coalition also saw the 
FTAAP  initiative  as  a  means  to  revive  APEC‘s  commercial  liberalization  program, 
especially keeping in mind the Bogor Goals‘ 2010 developed country deadline was fast 
approaching. 
 
                                                           
37 Singapore has long been a strong advocate of trade liberalization owing to the core entrepôt function 
of its economy. Taipei,China‘s motives for supporting the FTAAP were more geopolitical as the trans-
regional FTA would help circumvent the significant politic–diplomatic difficulties Taipei,China faced in 
developing its bilateral FTA policy because of its contested sovereignty predicament. 
38 APEC 2005 Leaders Declaration, or Busan Declaration. 18-19 November 2005. 
39 For example, Australia‘s ABAC representative Peter Charlton stated that ―although the best position is 
to have a successful outcome to the WTO negotiations, the primary position is that if everything else 
fails and the WTO fails on the Doha Round, then the FTAAP is the secondary choice.‖ (Business 
Times. 14 November 2006).  
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The main motive for the ABAC‘s support of the FTAAP was its potential to rationalize the 
trans-region‘s ―complete chaos‖ of bilateral and sub-regional FTAs into one harmonized 
Asia–Pacific agreement.
40 However, as in 2004 when the FTAAP was first proposed, a 
number of East Asian countries were opposed to the idea, most notably the PRC, Japan, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Japan stated its preference for its 
earlier proposed CEPEA, while the PRC was pushing an alternative APT-based East 
Asia  Free  Trade  Agreement  (EAFTA).  Thailand‘s  Director  General  of  the  Trade 
Negotiations, Chutima Bunyapraphasara, expressed the view that the FTAAP was both 
―unnecessary  and  impractical‖  owing  to  the  diversity  that  existed  amongst  APEC 
member  economies,  and  moreover  that  the  initiative  ―was  against  APEC‘s  original 
objective  of  voluntary  economic  co-operation.‖
41  At  the  2006  APEC  Summit,  the 
Philippines  Trade  Secretary  Peter  Favila  stated  his  government‘s  position  that  ―an 
FTAAP at this point will only distract us from the more important goal of restarting and 
concluding the [Doha Development Agenda] negotiations.‖
42  
 
As a compromise, it was agreed at the APEC 2006 Summit in Hanoi that an extensive 
feasibility study be undertaken on an FTAAP as a long-term prospect. A number of East 
Asian  countries  insisted  that  the  2006  Leaders  Declaration  include  the  following 
language:  ―We  also  reiterated  the  non-binding  and  voluntary  nature  of  the  model 
measures, bearing in mind that they will not prejudice the positions of APEC members in 
their  existing  and future  RTAs/FTAs  negotiations.‖  As  a  senior  Thai  official,  Virachai 
Plasai, commented at the time, ―APEC is not a negotiating forum. It is designed for co-
operation that is non-binding.‖
43  
 
Certainly the earlier IAP and EVSL episodes had demonstrated APEC‘s limitations in 
brokering new trade deals. As Yamazawa et al. (2000) contended that ―with its diverse 
membership of developed and developing economies, APEC cannot function like the EU 
or other legally and institutional binding arrangements.‖ Moreover, according to PECC‘s 
international  chairman,  Charles  Morrison,  ―even  before  [FTAAP]  negotiations  could 
begin, they would require major and controversial changes in APEC‘s social contract.‖
44 
Some  discussion  was  held  at  the  2007  Summit  at  Sydney  on  reassessing  APEC‘s 
organizational capacities and operational principles, including the possible enhancing of 
its Singapore-based Secretariat. However, many East Asian countries have remained 
opposed—as they have from the start—to conferring too much independence or any 
executive policy-making powers to APEC as an organizational entity. 
 
5.2.4   Problems of Balance in the APEC Agenda 
 
The continued strong East Asian support for APEC‘s ecotech programs is due to its 
emphasis on development capacity building and development co-operation. Many have 
argued that given the development diversity within APEC‘s membership, far more action 
                                                           
40 Washington Post. 20 November 2006. 
41 Bangkok Post. 10 November 2006. 
42 Washington Post. 20 November 2006. 
43 Associated Press. 14 November 2006. 
44 Agence France-Presse. 11 November 2006.  
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was required to assist lesser developed countries with their capacity building efforts, as 
best  served  by  ecotech  measures.  Moreover,  richer  member  states  doing  more  to 
directly  foster  the  development  of  weaker  member  states  would  better  enhance  the 
sense of regional solidarity within APEC compared to commercial liberalization.  East 
Asian countries have also pushed for greater integration between APEC‘s ecotech and 
commercial  liberalization  programs,  arguing  that  it  would  take  more  account  of 
developing  members‘  need  for  stronger  institutional  infrastructure  and  regulatory 
capacities  to  better  equip  them  when  meeting  the  competitive  challenges  posed  by 
liberalization (Berger and Beeson 2005, Elek and Soesastro 2000). The US, though, has 
generally  insisted  on  keeping  these  two  programmatic  strands  of  APEC  separate. 
Nesadurai  (2006)  remarks  how  this  typified  the  differences  of  approach  that  existed 
within APEC‘s membership concerning the state–market relationship, and therein how 
economies should be governed. East Asian members were generally more interested in 
APEC‘s developmental programs, while Anglo–Pacific members used the organization 
as a vehicle for market-liberal advocacy. 
 
Although a large number of ecotech projects have been initiated—covering areas such 
as human capital, infrastructure development, new technology development, sustainable 
development,  and  small-  and  medium-sized  (SME)  growth—the  whole  ecotech 
framework has suffered from ―a general lack of co-ordination and setting of priorities‖ 
(Ravenhill  2001),  leading  to  an  ineffective  impact.  Many  projects  were  neither  goal-
oriented with explicit objectives or performance criteria to be matched, nor were they 
subject to rigorous external assessment of their outcomes. Ecotech programs have also 
suffered from under-funding. Up until the year 2000, the total annual budget for these 
programs  never  exceeded  US$2  million,  and  this  situation  has  improved  little  since 
then.
45 In total, more than 1,200 ecotech projects had been initiated by 2008. In that 
same year, 212 projects were in operation worth a combined total of US$13.5 million for 
an average of a mere US$64,000 per project. 
 
Like APT, though, APEC has broadened its agenda and operational ability to address a 
wider  range  of  new  regional  issues,  such  as  energy  security  and  food  security. 
Regarding  the  former,  APEC‘s  co-operation  in  this  field  has  centered  on  its  Energy 
Security  Initiative  (ESI),  which  was  established  in  2001  and  developed  out  of  the 
organization‘s  Energy  Working  Group,  consisting  of  various  short-term  measures  to 
respond  to  temporary  energy  supply  disruptions  (e.g.,  oil  price  volatility,  occasional 
security  threats  to  sea-lanes  supply  routes),  as  well  as  longer-term  policy  measures 
aimed at addressing challenges concerning the region‘s energy supply security, such as 
technology  and  infrastructure  co-operation.  The  following  section  details  the  now 
considerable breadth of APEC‘s coverage of trans-regional affairs in the Asia–Pacific. 
Compared  with  its  response  to  the  1997/98  East  Asian  financial  crisis,  APEC  has 
arguably taken the recent 2008/09 global financial crisis more seriously as virtually all of 
its membership, rather than just its East Asian contingent, has been severely affected. 
The 2008 and 2009 Finance Ministers Meetings put forward a number of initiatives to 
address the crisis, but these have been relatively low-level responses (e.g., seminars, 
                                                           
45 Although the Japanese government continues to provide some generic funding for APEC‘s trade and 
investment facilitation projects, ecotech programs are usually funded by individual member states that 
have a strong interest in supporting particular projects.  
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workshops, small-scale capacity building programs) given the magnitude of the crisis 
events and impacts. 
 
In light of the problems APEC has faced on commercial liberalization, its more market-
liberal  member  economies  have  increasingly  pushed  structural  reform  onto  the 
organization‘s agenda since the mid-2000s as an alternative path to opening up the 
trans-region‘s economies. This has mainly  involved addressing issues of commercial 
regulation and is indicative of the diminishing importance of tariffs as barriers to trade. 
Commercial regulation primarily refers to competition policy, government procurement, 
intellectual  property  rights,  investment  rights,  and  rules  of  origin,  these  being  policy 
areas  where  the  most  significant  behind-the-border  impediments  to  commercial 
liberalization exist. These areas have also become increasingly prominent areas of FTA 
negotiation and increasingly relevant to realizing the Bogor Goals.  
 
5.3   Organizational Structure and Institutional Processes 
 
Of  all  the  institutions  examined  in  this  paper,  APEC  has  the  most  developed  and 
extensive organizational structure and institutionalized processes. However, this does 
not  mean  that  it  has  produced  the  most  effective  mechanisms  or  instruments  for 
advancing regional co-operation and integration in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific. The 
experience  of  APEC  demonstrates  that  it  can  be  very  difficult  to  make  substantive 
progress in this respect when there are so many diverse national interests to reconcile 
amongst a large number of member states or economies. Indeed, this was recognized in 
the  APEC  Ministerial  Statement  on  Membership  published  at  the  November  1997 
Foreign and Trade Ministerial Meeting held in Vancouver, which stated: ―While APEC 
has not set a permanent ceiling on the number of members, it will remain limited in size 
both on account of its Asia–Pacific regional character and because of the need for the 
group  to  remain  manageable  and  effective.‖  With  this  in  mind,  Asia–Pacific  leaders 
agreed  in  the  1997  Statement  to  consider  the  admission  of  any  new  members  in 
accordance to the following criteria: 
 
(i)  be located in the Asia–Pacific region (although the 1997 Statement does 
not define the geographic boundaries or other basis of the region); 
(ii)  have  substantial  and  broad-based  economic  links  with  existing  APEC 
members; 
(iii)  be pursuing externally-oriented, market-driven economic policies; 
(iv)  accept  the  existing  basic  objectives  and  principles  of  various  APEC 
declarations; and 
(v)  be able to produce IAPs and participate in the CAP process. 
 
There are three observer members of APEC, all of which are regional organizations: 
PECC, ASEAN, and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). In addition, there are a number of 
guest members, normally governments or international organizations, which participate 
in various APEC groups and initiatives (e.g., the Energy Business Network) on a needs-
based basis. The high-level organizational structure of APEC is quite similar to APT‘s, 
with  annual  summit meetings (officially  between  Economic  Leaders  to  accommodate 
Hong  Kong,  China  and  Taipei,China‘s  diplomatic  status),  ministerial  meetings,  and 
senior officials meetings. As a regional organization rather than a regional framework,  
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APEC has a stronger corporate identity and institutional foundation. Its Secretariat  is 
based in Singapore, with a staff of 64 personnel,
46 and is the organization‘s main co-
ordinating  and  information  management  agency.  Its  legal  status  is  that  of  an 
international organization based in Singapore that has no executive powers or any rule-
making mechanisms as APEC essentially works on a non-binding basis where member 
economy peer pressure is the strongest force of influence with regard to complying with 
APEC objectives. 
 
Figure  4  outlines  the  main  elements  of  APEC‘s  institutional  structure.  As  Economic 
Leaders  summits  were  only  convened  from  1993,  APEC  co-operation  was  initially  a 
ministerial-  and  senior-official-driven  process.  The  Ministerial  Meeting  element  was 
substantially  enhanced  after  1993,  with  a  number  of  new  meeting  arrangements 
(Finance, Trade, SMEs, Environment, Telecommunications and Information Technology, 
Transportation) introduced soon thereafter. The policy areas covered by APEC‘s SOMs 
closely mirror those of the associated Ministerial Meeting process. Four SOMs are held 
a  year  and  they  are  a  driving  force  behind  the  APEC  process,  consisting  of 
representatives from the Economic and Foreign ministries of member economies. All 
groups below the SOM level report directly to these SOMs. In addition, there are ad hoc 
meetings  between  senior  officials  (but  not  formal  SOMs)  on  various  sector-specific 
issues. Furthermore, there exists a close similarity between the SOM and Ministerial 
Meeting policy areas covered by APEC and APT, although the latter has a deeper level 
of  sub-SOM  governmental  meetings  (e.g.,  at  the  director  general  level)  in  its 
organizational structure. This is perhaps due to APT being more of a government official 
driven process compared with APEC, owing to the greater influence that government 
bureaucrats have over the policy-making process in East Asian countries compared with 
Anglo–Pacific countries, where politicians and civil society have more influence.  
 
At  the  policy  level,  APEC‘s  general  direction  is  driven  by  the  Economic  Leaders 
meetings although this, in turn, is influenced primarily by SOM and Ministerial Meeting 
processes. Policy decisions and initiatives are additionally influenced by ideas from the 
APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), a representative from which attends relevant 
Ministerial Meetings. The annual Economic Leaders‘ Declarations outline the general 
policy priorities for APEC over the course of the year until the next summit meeting. At 
the  working  level,  various  SOM  meetings—each  normally  held  three  or four  times a 
year—play a key role in helping organize APEC‘s work programs, giving guidance to 
APEC  Committees,  Working  Groups,  and  Task  Forces,  and  developing 
recommendations  for  the  Ministerial  Meeting  and  Economic  Leaders‘  Meeting.  The 
Committee  on  Trade  and  Investment  (CTI)  is  primarily  responsible  for  co-ordinating 
APEC‘s work on trade and investment liberalization and business facilitation. Meanwhile, 
the SOM Committee on Ecotech (SCE) assists the SOM in co-ordinating and managing 
the  organization‘s  ecotech  agenda,  and  identifies  potential  areas  for  economic  and 




                                                           
46 October 2009 figure, comprising 25 seconded professionals, 29 administrative support staff, and 10 
staff in APEC‘s Policy Support Unit.  
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On  budgetary  and  project  funding  matters,  the  Budget  and  Management  Committee 
(BMC) advises the SOM on budgetary, administrative, and managerial issues, as well as 
monitors  and  evaluates  the  project  outcomes  of  work  undertaken  by  APEC‘s 
Committees and Working Groups. In addition, it makes recommendations to the SOM 
process on how to improve APEC‘s operational efficiency and effectiveness. Member 
economies make annual contributions to APEC‘s budget and also make ad hoc financial 
contributions to various projects that interest them, as noted earlier regarding ecotech 
initiatives. The organization has three funding schemes that finance various types of 
project-based work. The first is APEC‘s Operational Account (AOA) that funds projects in 
support of its ecotech agenda. The AOA derives from a share of members‘ contributions 
to the organization based on what one research interviewee from the APEC Secretariat 
referred to as an ―esoteric formula.‖
47 In 2009 there was a 30% increase in the AOA 
budget, but the annual amount is still only a mere US$2 million. The second funding 
scheme  is  the  Trade  and  Investment  Liberalization  and  Facilitation  Special  Account, 
which  was  devised  to  accommodate  contributions  that  members  wished  to  make  in 
funding co-operative project initiatives in this aspect of APEC‘s work. The Trade and 
Investment Liberalization and Facilitation Special Account is run by the CTI and has 
been solely funded by Japan from its inception in the late 1990s. It works on an annual 
budget of US$8 million  and is  weighted more towards funding trade and investment 
facilitation schemes. Finally, the APEC Support Fund began with an initial contribution 
from  Australia,  had  an  annual  budget  of  US$9.4  million  in  2009,  and  helps  provide 
financial assistance to capacity building programs for developing member economies, 
particularly for engaging in the organization‘s work programs, such as structural reform. 
Overall, the three funds are relatively small, amounting to just a few million US dollars, 
and therefore their impact of the projects they finance is quite limited.  
 
The Economic Committee has existed for a number of years but has been most recently 
been charged with overseeing APEC‘s structural reform agenda through policy analysis 
and action-oriented tasks. The parameters of the Economic Committee‘s work is broadly 
determined  by  the  Leaders‘  Agenda  to  Implement  Structural  Reform  (LAISR),  an 
ambitious work program that extends just beyond commercial regulatory matters and 
covers five stated areas of structural reform: (i) regulatory reform, (ii) competition policy, 
(iii) public sector governance, (iv) corporate governance, and (v) strengthening economic 
and legal infrastructure. The LAISR was launched in 2004 with target objectives set for 
2010.  A  Good  Practice  Guide  on  Regulatory  Reform  has  been  produced  to  help 
members design and improve their regulatory frameworks. The first Structural Reform 
Ministerial Meeting was held in August 2008 at Melbourne and called upon APEC to 
extend  the  LAISR  beyond  2010.  The  Economic  Committee‘s  2008  APEC  Economic 
Policy  Report  (AEPR)  emphasized  the  importance  of  a  strong  competition  policy  in 
generating  positive  welfare  outcomes.  Its  2009  AEPR  focused  on  the  theme  of 
regulatory reform. The Economic Committee‘s expert group on Competition Policy and 
Law has also produced a database on competition policy legislation across the APEC 
membership area and organized training courses and conferences, and the Economic 
Committee  has  organized  a  number  of  other  workshops  and  seminars  on  structural 
reform  issues.  The  Economic  Committee  and  the  CTI  worked  closely  together,  for 
                                                           
47  Research  interview  with  APEC  Secretariat  official,  Singapore,  September  2009.  According  to  this 
research interviewee, this esoteric formula has been a bone of contention for a number of years.  
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instance, introducing the Supply Chain Connectivity Initiative on trade logistics, which 
arose out of the Joint EC–CTI Trade Policy Dialogue on Trade Logistics that took place 
in February 2009. The work of APEC‘s Economic Committee is underpinned by Working 
Groups and Special Task Groups: 
 
(i)  Working Groups. There are currently 11 of these sector-specific groups 
that specialize in various aspects of APEC‘s agenda (Figure 4), most of 
which were established in 1990 and 1991. 
(ii)  Special Task Groups. These groups have arisen in response to new key 
issues in APEC‘s agenda over time, such as Counter Terrorism (2003) 
and Emergency Preparedness (2005). These groups, in effect, help fill 
gaps in APEC‘s work program by addressing new topical and relevant 
challenges facing member economies. 
 
The main  purpose  of  the  ABAC  is  to  incorporate  the  views  and  perspectives  of the 
business community into APEC decision-making processes. It meets four times a year 
and comprises up to three senior business representatives from each member economy 
and  various  sectors  of  the  business  community,  including  the  SME  sector.  Recent 
themes  of  action  have  included  the  championing  of  regional  economic  integration, 
addressing  protectionist  measures,  urging  governments  to  conclude  the  WTO  Doha 
Round, and supporting G20 commitments to countering the global financial crisis. In 
addition to the ABAC, annual APEC CEO Summits have been convened since 1996 to 
bring  together  high-level  business  executives  to  participate  in  the  Leaders‘  Meeting 
process, thus providing the opportunity for political and business leaders to exchange 
views on the state of Asia–Pacific‘s regional economic and business affairs. A number of 
industry  sector  dialogues  have  also  been  created,  such  as  the  APEC  Automotive 
Dialogue and the APEC Chemical Dialogue. There are apparently no plans to introduce 
a parallel summit arrangement for NGO leaders from APEC‘s membership as many East 
Asian countries are not comfortable with such an idea.
48 
 
Stakeholder  participation  amongst  the  research  and  academic  community  is  mainly 
organized  around  APEC  Study  Centers  (ASCs)  that  were  established  from  1993 
onwards and which seek to actively engage academics and research institute staff in 
intellectual  exchanges  and  analysis  on  regional  economic  affairs  affecting  the  Asia–
Pacific. There are currently ASCs in 20 member economies that involve around 100 
universities and research institutes from the trans-region. A more recent addition to the 
organizational structure is the APEC Policy Support Unit (PSU), established in 2008 as a 
result  of  a  decision  taken  at  the  Sydney  2007  APEC  Ministerial  Meeting.  The  main 
purpose of the PSU is to provide analytical, research, and evaluation capacity on policy 
matters, as well as playing a co-ordinating role on ecotech issues. It also undertakes 
research on key aspects of the LAISR agenda on structural reform. 
 
The aforementioned Action Plans of APEC have been established specifically to help the 
organization realize its Bogor Goals of free trade and investment in the Asia–Pacific. The 
1995 Osaka Action Plan represents APEC‘s original strategic roadmap and lays down a 
number of general principles on commercial liberalization that member economies are 
                                                           
48 Research interview with APEC Secretariat official, September 2009.  
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supposed  to  comply  with.  One  of  these  principles  is  non-discrimination,  which  is 
inherently  problematic  with  the  aforementioned  FTA  policies  of  most  APEC  member 
states.  There  is  also  the  issue  of  whether  APEC  has  produced  too  many  plans  in 
general, leading to credibility problems. Most APEC summits have produced a special 
plan or program ascribed to the summit-hosting city, but the lack of progress made by 
APEC on its centerpiece Bogor Goals project since the mid-1990s has created some 
confusion  regarding  how  certain  plans  and  programs  relate  to  others.  For  example, 
proposals on feasibility studying the FTAAP and establishing the six model measures of 
FTA  practice  are  embodied  within  the  2006  Hanoi  Action  Plan,  which  is  not  to  be 
confused with ASEAN‘s Hanoi Plan of Action on regional economic integration. Does the 
Hanoi Action Plan make redundant the preceding 1995 Osaka Action Plan and 1996 
Manila  Action  Plan  on  achieving  the  Bogor  Goals?  This  has  not  been  clarified. 
Furthermore, the official name of the 2006 plan is the Hanoi Action Plan to Implement 
the Busan Road Map to Achieve the Bogor Goals, which appears to be a clumsy attempt 
to establish some kind of bureaucratic consistency between three plans spanning more 
than  a  decade.  One  could  argue  that  subsequent  plans  upgrade  and  augment  the 
proposals embodied by preceding plans—for instance, 2006 Hanoi in relation to 2005 
Busan—  yet  the  impact  of  the  Busan  Road  Map  has  nevertheless  been  somewhat 
diminished by this cannibalization process.  
 
Each hosting country wishes to leave its mark on the development of APEC, but the 
organization‘s  propensity  to  produce  monumental-sounding  plans  of  thin  and  easily 
recyclable  substance  only  serves  to  undermine  the  organization‘s  credibility  and 
relevance. Indeed, at the 2006 Summit, leaders from Australia, the PRC, Malaysia, New 
Zealand,  and  Singapore  told  their  audience  that  APEC  was  in  danger  of  becoming 
increasingly irrelevant in Asia–Pacific affairs.
49 This was supported by evidence from a 
recent PECC survey conducted amongst 483 regional opinion leaders in which only 43% 
agreed with the following statement: ―APEC is as important today as it was in 1989‖ 
(PECC 2008). The majority of those surveyed believed that APEC‘s biggest problem 
was the low level of commitment shown by its member economies to advance its main 
projects,  and  its  lack  of  focus  on  new  emerging  issues  such  as  energy  security. 
Deepening  regional  integration  in  East  Asia  was  also  highlighted  as  another  key 
challenge facing APEC. 
 
The  three  APEC  Official  Observers—the  ASEAN  Secretariat,  PECC,  and  the  Pacific 
Islands  Forum (PIF)  Secretariat—are  supposed  to  play  a general  partnership  role  in 
helping APEC realize its objectives. They are invited to relevant meetings and have full 
access  to  documents  and  information.  APEC  also  maintains  close  inter-institutional 
linkages with PBEC and PECC, as will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
5.4   Impacts and Key Issues for the Future 
 
APEC has the most extensively developed organizational and institutional structure of 
the six regional institutions studied in this paper. To date, it appears to have had far 
greater success at advancing many small-scale regional co-operation initiatives rather 
than  its  larger-scale  initiatives.  In  other  words,  although  largely  failing  to  make 
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substantial  and  claimable  progress  with  programs  and  initiatives—the  IAP,  EVSL, 
FTAAP—integral to its big flagship project, the Bogor Goals, it appears to have made 
some progress with a mass of smaller projects. These have dealt mostly with business 
facilitation,  new  regional  issues,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  on  ecotech,  rather  than 
commercial liberalization. APEC has also had an impact on capacity building and norm-
setting amongst its member economies, such as ecotech projects (i) helping to improve 
the technocratic systems and skills of lesser developed economies‘ governments, and 
(ii)  conditioning  PRC  and  Vietnamese  leaders  to  global  trade  norms  and  rules  with 
regard to their WTO accession. 
 
The  significant  diversity  of  APEC‘s  membership  has  meant  it  has  had  to  exercise 
considerable flexibility on many of its larger-scale initiatives. This has, however, caused 
certain  credibility  problems  for  the  organization.  The  perhaps  intentional  neglect  of 
establishing which Bogor Goal deadline—2010 or 2020—is supposed to apply to which 
member  economy,  as  well  as  failing  to  establish  clear  evaluation  criteria  to  judge 
whether member economies have realized the Bogor Goals on commercial liberalization, 
is highly problematic for APEC. The first of these deadlines is upon the organization, and 
at the time of writing it had no structure in place to properly assess whether the 2010 
targets  would  be  met  or  not.  APEC‘s  credibility  is  also  being  weakened  by  the 
disaggregation  problem.  By  often  having  to  rely  on  the  principle  of  voluntary 
unilateralism,  given  the  organization‘s  lack  of  binding  rules  and  enforcement 
mechanisms, it is difficult for APEC to claim exactly what actual difference it is making 
on commercial liberalization and economic policy reform in specific action terms. For 
example,  regarding APEC‘s structural reform agenda, which concerns both domestic 
and international economic policy matters, how is it possible to disaggregate the impact 
made here by APEC from various other influences, such as the separately instigated 
unilateral actions of member governments, the effects of FTAs, and other international 
pressures  on  member  economies  to  change  their  commercial  regulation  regimes 
accordingly?  
 
One could argue that APEC has helped strengthen the policy culture for liberalization 
and economic reform in the Asia–Pacific, but the disaggregation problem is one faced by 
regional organizations that rely on the passive integration approach. In practice, this 
approach  is  primarily  concerned  with  removing  barriers  to  integration as  opposed  to 
proactive integration that involves creating new and distinct co-operative mechanisms, 
such as the CMIM and ABMI (Dent 2008a). The supposed achievements and benefits of 
APEC as highlighted on its website are indicative of this problem, claiming or at least 
implying that the organization has been responsible for (i) reducing trade barriers in the 
trans-region from an average of 16.9% in 1989 to 5.5% by 2004, (ii) reducing business 
transaction costs by 5.0% amongst its member economies between 2002 and 2006, and 
(iii)  removing  behind-the-border  trade  barriers  through  APEC‘s  structural  reform 
agenda.
50 On the same webpage, it is also claimed—at least by inference—that the now 
large number of FTAs signed in the Asia–Pacific is an APEC achievement. Even if this 
claim  were  legitimate,  it  would  appear  to  be  self-defeating  given  the  structured 
preferentialism  that  these  agreements  have  created  in  the  region‘s  trade  relations 
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(Bhagwati 2008, Dent 2006). While no doubt APEC has made some contribution to the 
above, other factors are far more likely to have made the substantial impact. 
 
The above debate also relates to the question of which institution has, or will develop, 
the best instruments for advancing regional co-operation and integration in East Asia 
and  the  Asia–Pacific.  APEC  seems  to  have  developed  a  number  of  relatively  small 
instruments, making most progress on business facilitation, but these do not appear to 
have captured the public‘s attention over the last decade or so in the same way as the 
launch  of  the  Bogor  Goals.  Aside  from  the  FTAAP,  which  does  not  have  strong 
consensus support within APEC anyway, the organization has not really launched a new 
bold plan for regional co-operation and integration since the mid-1990s. With even the 
most market-liberal and developed APEC member  economies looking  likely to fail in 
meeting the 2010 Bogor Goal target on commercial liberalization, Japan as hosts of the 
2010 APEC Summit will be under pressure to deliver a bold new initiative to revitalize 
the organization. In addition to suggesting that APEC should adopt a stronger variable 
geometry approach on future commercial liberalization, Yamazawa (2009) also proposes 
that  the  organization  should  do  more  to  tackle  new  global  challenges  such  as  the 
environment, energy issues, and poverty alleviation. These ideas should be seriously 
considered as they take into account APEC‘s diverse and large membership, and the 




6.   Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC)  
 
6.1   Origins and Development 
 
PBEC  was established  in 1967, its origins deriving from  an existing Japan–Australia 
private sector forum that was initially extended to include business representatives from 
the  US,  New  Zealand,  and  Canada,  and  thereafter  from  other  Asia–Pacific  member 
states.  At  its  inaugural  meeting  hosted  by  Japan  in  Tokyo  in  April  1967,  around  60 
officials  were  in  attendance.  Developments  in  European  integration  during  this  time 
reportedly  provided  inspiration  for  PBEC‘s  key  protagonists  to  initiate  some  sort  of 
regional  integration  and  co-operation  process  in  the  Pacific.
51  In  1968,  PBEC‘s  First 
General  Meeting  was  convened  in  Sydney.  An  agreement  to  establish  a  permanent 
Secretariat was made at the Sixth PBEC Annual Meeting in 1973, this being originally 
based at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in the US. Energy and global recessions 
were key issues of debate from the 1970s to the early 1980s. The PBEC Secretariat was 
relocated to Honolulu in 1992, and by 1994 PBEC‘s membership had expanded to 12 
countries, including the PRC and Russia, which both joined that year.  By the late 1990s, 
the  PBEC  Environmental  Working  Committee  and  PBEC  Environmental  Award  had 
been  established,  as  well  as  its  Working  Committee  on  Transparency  that  primarily 
sought to address corruption in business–government relationships. In 2004, the PBEC 
Secretariat was moved again, this time to Hong Kong, China. 
 
In 2005, PBEC changed its membership model from one based on countries to that of 
companies,  or  so-called  direct  corporate  members  (DCMs).  At  first,  the  organization 
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succeeded  in  attracting  many  hundreds  of  firms  operating  around  the  Asia–Pacific 
region, although the DCM model did not appeal to many Northeast Asian countries—
Japan,  the  PRC,  Russia,  and  Korea—as  they  preferred  to  have  some  level  of 
government or national committee representation in PBEC. Most recently, intensifying 
competition  from  rival  and  better  resourced  regional  business  fora  and  networking 
events  organized  by  Forbes  Asia,  The  Economist,  Business Week,  and  others  have 
posed  a  significant  challenge  to  PBEC.  In  addition,  Asia–Pacific  governments  have 
gradually given more attention to the earlier discussed APEC Business Advisory Council 
(ABAC) when seeking views from the trans-region‘s business community rather than 
from PBEC. The above problems  have contributed to an approximate halving of the 
number  of  DCM  members  in  PBEC  over  the  last  few  years,  and  its  budget  has 
correspondingly fallen by roughly the same proportion from around US$1 million in the 
mid-2000s to around US$400,000 by 2009. In response, the organization adjusted its 
membership model in 2008 to a mixed formula of companies and governments to help 
bolster  its  financial  position.  To  some  extent,  this  partial  reversion  to  including 
government representation has undermined PBEC‘s earlier initiated attempts to promote 
itself  as  the  independent  voice  of  business,  given  that  ABAC  representatives  are 
appointed  by  APEC  member  governments.  Prior  to  ABAC‘s  creation,  PBEC  used  to 
promote  itself  as  the  voice  of  business  in  the  Asia–Pacific.  These  efforts  by  PBEC, 
though, appear not to be having that notable an effect. The organization, once the de 
facto  representative  agency  for  business  in  APEC  diplomacy,  is  being  increasingly 
eclipsed  by  ABAC  and  its  APEC  CEO  Summit.  PBEC‘s  Board  of  Directors  have 
reportedly yet to produce a robust strategy to take the organization forward. The idea of 
a merger with PECC has allegedly been considered as one possible option.
52 
 
6.2   Issue Coverage, Agenda Setting and Instrumentalization 
 
PBEC‘s main function is to bring together business and economic leaders to forge closer 
commercial relationships across the Asia–Pacific. Its agenda and issue coverage are 
broadly determined by its principal objectives:  
 
(i)  promote an open business environment and competitiveness in the Asia–
Pacific, with a view to strengthening trade and investment relations in the 
trans-region; 
(ii)  foster  networking  and  other  forms  of  collaboration  (e.g.,  information 
exchange) amongst its membership; 
(iii)  provide services to members that increase their business opportunities; 
(iv)  support co-operative business activities that have positive welfare effects 
for citizens of the Asia–Pacific; 
(v)  advise  governments  on  improving  the  trans-region‘s  business 
environment; 
(vi)  cultivate  good  corporate  social  responsibility  practices  amongst  its 
members,  including  contributing  towards  sustainable  development 
outcomes; 
(vii)  promote foreign investment flows that support the economic development 
objectives of Asia–Pacific countries; and 
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(viii)  stimulate  the  business  environment  for  the  development  and 
implementation of new technologies. 
 
The  main  services  that  PBEC  provides  to  its  members  fall  into  the  following  four 
categories: 
 
(i)  Networking.  PBEC  provides  services  through  a  variety  of  activities, 
including  Annual  Meetings,  a  Distinguished  CEO  Series,  Regional 
Executive Meetings, retreats, workshops, and business matchmaking. 
(ii)  Business  advocacy.  PBEC‘s  leverages  relationships  among 
government,  civil  society,  and  the  business  community  on  various 
commercial  policy  matters,  and  maintains  close  relationships  with 
important international organizations. 
(iii)  Business  development.  PBEC‘s  provides  various  advisory  services, 
business expeditions, and web-based business intelligence resources. 
(iv)  Market  intelligence  and  analysis.  PBEC  offers  its  members  PBEC 
Reports, PBEC News Alerts and Surveys, trade missions, and business 
matchmaking services. 
 
6.3   Organizational Structure and Institutional Processes 
 
The legal status of PBEC is that of a Hong Kong, China-registered, non-profit company 
founded  on  its  own  constitution.  The  organization  is  headed  by  a  Chairman,  who 
normally  serves  a  2-year  term  and  leads  PBEC‘s  Board  of  Directors,  including  the 
President, who manages the Secretariat that is currently based in Hong Kong,  China 
and  comprises  a  staff  of  four  personnel.  The  organization‘s  Annual  Meeting  serves 
summit-like functions, bringing together key business leaders and a number of political 
leaders from around the trans-region to discuss topical and emerging issues facing the 
Asia–Pacific  business  community.  PBEC  works  with  officials  from  Asia–Pacific 
governments  on  emerging  issues  affecting  the  trans-region‘s  development.  The 
organization  also  works  with  other  international  organizations—APEC,  ASEAN,  ADB, 
WTO,  OECD,  and  the  World  Bank—in  presenting  the  Asia–Pacific‘s  business 
community‘s  viewpoints  in  important  decision-making  processes.  An  example  of  this 
collaboration is PBEC‘s work on the ADB–OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative. 
 
6.4   Impacts and Key Issues for the Future 
 
Of the six regional institutions studied in this paper, PBEC is by far the most at risk of 
becoming increasingly irrelevant, and even possibly becoming de-activated. The number 
of regional or international organizations in Asia and the Asia–Pacific has proliferated, 
and inevitably this intensifies some degree of competition amongst them as they vie for 
the interests and attention of both states and non-state actors. PBEC appears to be a 
victim of this competition, becoming increasingly marginalized by ABAC in particular. 
Furthermore, as PBEC straddles both the inter-state and international business sectors, 
its position is also being challenged by corporate networking firms such as Forbes Asia. 
Overall, PBEC needs fresh strategic impetus from its Board of Directors if it is to have an 
impact on future regional institution building in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific. 
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7.   Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) 
 
7.1   Origins and Early Development 
 
PECC was created in 1980 as a tripartite partnership of key representatives from the 
government, business, and academic and research communities to discuss economic 
policy challenges facing Asia–Pacific nations. Its main focus is on trade, investment, and 
finance, serving as a forum for policy co-operation and co-ordination across the trans-
region.  It  is  the  only  non-government  official  observer  of  APEC,  and  one  of  its  key 
functions is to provide economic intelligence and other forms of analytical support to 
APEC meetings and processes. Hence, PECC generally works in closer collaboration 
with APEC than does PBEC. Furthermore, PECC member economies (22 in 2010) very 
close match those of APEC‘s, having in addition Columbia, Ecuador, and the Pacific 
Islands Forum, but not Papua New Guinea or Russia.
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7.2   Issue Coverage, Agenda Setting, and Instrumentalization 
 
PECC covers a wide agenda of economic issues pertinent to the Asia–Pacific. In many 
respects, its analytical work and dialogue mechanisms closely mirrors that of APEC‘s 
own agenda. PECC‘s work program and agenda is determined mainly by its Standing 
Committee  and  the  task  force  study  initiatives  it  sets  in  motion,  as  detailed  in  the 
following section. Past examples of task force study themes have included free trade 
agreements, human resources development, energy security, food security, sustainable 
cities, and eco-tourism. 
 
7.3   Organizational Structure and Institutional Processes 
 
The  official  legal  status  of  PECC  is  relatively  complicated  as  it  is  a  recognized 
international organization in Singapore, but its official legal status (PECC Fund Ltd.) is 
as a registered company with charitable status in Hong Kong, China. Its Secretariat is 
staffed by five permanent personnel and is based in Singapore, indeed in the same 
location as ASEF and the APEC Secretariat on the campus of the National University of 
Singapore. PECC‘s charter has undergone a series of revisions since its creation. One 
such  revision  introduced  the  rule  that  any  national  committee  that  has  not  paid  its 
membership  contribution  for  3 consecutive  years  had  its  membership  automatically 
suspended. This rule has recently been applied to Russia for failing to pay its fees to the 
organization. PECC‘s annual budget is currently around US$600,000 and contributions 
from member economies are based on a formula of GDP and GDP per capita levels, 
with a special rate  applying for ASEAN members. Accession criteria for  becoming a 
PECC member are based on whether an applicant 
 
(i)  accepts the objectives of PECC and the principles set out in its Charter, 
(ii)  demonstrates a commitment to economic co-operation in the Asia–Pacific 
based on free and open economic exchanges, 
(iii)  has extensive economic activities in the Asia–Pacific, 
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(iv)  establishes  a  viable  PECC  member  committee  in  its  own  country  or 
economy, and 
(v)  makes a substantial contribution to a number of PECC work programs.  
 
Associate  membership  may  be  granted  to  committees  from  other  Asia–Pacific 
economies  that  have  demonstrated  sustained  interest  and  involvement  in  PECC 
activities and programs, and as such may participate in all PECC activities and programs 
except  meetings  of  the  Standing  Committee.  France  and  its  Pacific  Territories  are 
currently the only associate members of the organization. Mongolia was an associate 
member until it became a full member in 2008. Institutional membership has also been 
granted  to  PBEC  and  PAFTAD  and  may  be  granted  to  other  organizations  and 
institutions with common aims and objectives. Institutional members do not have voting 
rights  within  the  Standing  Committee.  The  Pacific  Island  Forum  is  considered  a  full 
member but does not have to pay a membership contribution. 
 
PECC‘s  main  governing  body  is  its  Standing  Committee,  which  meets  annually  and 
comprises all of the organization‘s 22 full Member Committees, 2 Institutional Members 
(PAFTAD  and  PBEC),  and  invited  Associate  Member  (French  Pacific  Territories) 
Committees.  Its  Member  Committees  draw  upon  tripartite  representation  from  the 
member economy or group in question that participate in PECC‘s various work program 
activities and their own activities at a more local level. The Standing Committee decides 
on a series of ad hoc task force initiatives on a 2-year cycle, which are the primary 
mechanisms of PECC‘s work program that undertake research on key emerging issues 
in  the  trans-region.  Membership  of  these  task  forces  is  based  on  PECC  tripartite 
principles,  thus  bringing  together  relevant  experts  from  government,  business,  and 
academia. The number of task forces initiated has varied from time to time. For the 
2008/09 period, four PECC task forces were created that covered the following themes: 
 
(i)  Regional Institutional Architecture. Amongst other things, one aspect 
of  this  task  force‘s  study  was  to  consider  the  reasons  why  APEC  is 
viewed by some as losing its relevance, and why attention has generally 
shifted  to more  exclusively  East  Asian  regional  arrangements  such  as 
APT. 
(ii)  Asia–Pacific  Education  Market.  This  task  force  examines  growing 
competition  and  co-operation  in  the  international  education  market,  as 
well as investigating new developments in the education sector and their 
impact on regional economic integration in the Asia–Pacific. 
(iii)  International Labor Mobility in the Asia Pacific. This task force studies 
the  interplay  between  globalization,  demographic  change,  and 
international migration in the trans-region. 
(iv)  State of the Region Report. This task force is responsible for producing 
PECC‘s flagship annual report on the current state of Asia–Pacific affairs. 
In  some  cases,  task  forces  have  established  special  policy  forums  (e.g.,  on  trade, 
energy,  and  mining),  and  representatives  from  these  fora  are  invited  to  their 
corresponding  APEC  working  group  meetings.  Additional  elements  to  PECC‘s  work 
program  include  the  organization‘s  collaboration  on  certain  international  projects  that  
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include  freshwater  security  and  management,  financial  centers  in  the  Asia–Pacific, 
SMEs,  and  climate  change.  The  Executive  Committee  of  PECC  is  a  subset  of  its 
Standing Committee that oversees the organization‘s ongoing work and also performs a 
monitoring and evaluation function. The Secretariat is the administrative arm of PECC, 
facilitating meetings, and managing the website and the organization‘s budget.  
 
7.4   Impacts and Key Issues for the Future 
 
There is a general view that PECC‘s main purpose is to support the work of APEC by 
providing  various  forms  of  intellectual  and  analytical  services.  According  to  an 
interviewed official from the organization, PECC considers itself a progenitor of APEC, 
although the relationship has evolved over time. During the 1990s, APEC adopted a 
significant number of PECC recommendations on commercial policy issues, such as the 
Non-Binding Investment Principles in 1993/94, Competition Principles in 1999, Services 
Trade  and  Investment  in  2000/03,  Corporate  Governance  Guidelines  in  2001,  and 
Common  Understanding  on  FTAs/RTAs  in  2001/03  (PECC  2005).  Although  PECC 
operates independently of APEC, there was an attempt made between the mid-1990s 
and early-2000s to shadow the APEC agenda, but this proved too ambitious and time-
consuming,  and  entailed  PECC  staff  getting  bogged  down  with  extensive  technical 
surveys and analyses on matters such as FTAs. The organization changed tack in 2005, 
focusing PECC‘s efforts on thought leadership in relation to APEC and other Pacific 
community building processes. PECC is hoping to have a greater intellectual impact in 
the  future  concerning  the  aforementioned  issues  of  labor  mobility  in  the  region,  the 
development of the region‘s education market, and the emerging regional institutional 
architecture of the Asia–Pacific. Regarding the last of these, PECC‘s task force report on 
the Asia–Pacific‘s regional institutional architecture recommended that it should expand 
its agenda beyond just economic issues to incorporate the ―big political and security 
issues of the region and even the world‖ (PECC 2009: 11).  
 
According  to  a  research  interviewed  PECC  official,  probably  the  biggest  difficulty  in 
providing this thought leadership is distinguishing the demarcations between regional 
and global issues and challenges, and at what level to address them.
54 To conclude, 
although PECC‘s operations and resources are relatively small-scale, the organization 
has a clearly defined purpose and retains a good working relationship with APEC, and 
therefore appears to have much stronger prospects than PBEC at this time. 
 
 
8.  Conclusion: Towards a New Regional Institutional 
Architecture? 
 
This paper has discussed regional institutional developments involving the whole of East 
Asia.  Six  region-based  frameworks  and  organizations  have  been  examined.  Four  of 
these  were  supra-structure  institutions:  (i)  ASEAN  Plus  Three  (APT),  (ii)  East  Asia 
Summit (EAS), (iii) Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), and (iv) Asia–Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) forum. The other two were supporting institutions: (i) Pacific Basin 
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Economic Council (PBEC), and (ii) Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). The 
conclusion  summarizes  the  different  areas  of  debate  raised  and  highlights  key 
arguments. It particularly focuses on what likely future regional institutional architecture 
centered on East Asia may emerge in the coming years. 
 
Variable Geography and What is East Asia? 
 
One of the key issues for the East Asian region has been which countries are eligible to 
be considered members of it, and therefore eligible to participate in East Asian regional 
community  and  regional  institution  building  processes.  As  was  discussed,  this  is 
particularly  relevant  to  the  EAS.  It  was  argued  that  the  variable  geography  principle 
applied to East Asia just as with other regional constructs, such as the Asia–Pacific, in 
that differentiated conceptions of which countries may or may not qualify for regional 
membership can co-exist. Hence, the geographic boundaries of regions are ultimately 
contestable, and moreover may shift over time in accordance to the changing dynamics 
of regionalized economic, socio-cultural, and political linkages. Furthermore, qualification 
for  regional  membership  can  depend  on  the  fundaments  that  have  shaped  our 
understanding of regions themselves as distinct coherent entities. In East Asia‘s case, 
the  region  has  been  largely  defined  in  terms  of  deepening  regional  economic 
interdependence and coherence. On this basis, geographically proximate countries (e.g. 
India, Australia) that became increasing integral to the core East Asia regional economy 
would therefore have a strong claim for regional membership. This is a key reason why 
Japan was able to argue a case for India, Australia, and New Zealand‘s eligibility as 
original EAS member states. The economic field has also been the principal area of co-
operation for all six regional bodies studied in this paper, and where most progress has 
been made on regional co-operation and integration in East Asia generally. Arguably, 
the most significant progress here has been achieved by APT, especially on regional 
financial governance.  
 
Competing or Compatible Goals and Agendas 
 
While  the  variable  geography  principle  explains  how  closely  overlapping  regional 
institutional arrangements (e.g., APT and EAS) can co-exist, this relationship will break 
down if they are working at competing or irreconcilable goals and agendas. Likewise, 
there is sometimes a fine line between the mutual reinforcing, rather than duplication, of 
institutional efforts. For example, APT, EAS, and APEC are all looking to establish firmer 
regional agreements on free trade and energy security. Notwithstanding their differences 
in regional membership, East Asian countries lie at the core of all three regional groups, 
and  questions  are  already  being  asked  whether  a  more  explicit  division-of-labor 
arrangement between them is preferable to undertaking very similar regional-level tasks. 
This  especially  applies  to  the  APT  and  EAS  regional  frameworks.  Where  closely 
overlapping  regional  institutional  arrangements  are  evident,  then  the  matter  of  inter-
institutional co-ordination becomes more important with regard to regional community 
building. It was noted that the ASEAN Secretariat has assigned a couple of its divisions 
to work on APT and EAS matters, which provides some level (albeit relatively minor) of 
co-ordinating services in this respect. A different kind of inter-institutional relationship 
exists among APEC, PECC, and PBEC, where PECC, in particular, continues to provide  
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key  supporting  functions  (especially  intellectual  and  analytical  in  nature)  for  various 
areas of APEC‘s work agenda. 
 
ASEAN as Intermediary Facilitator 
 
The role that ASEAN plays in both the APT and EAS is an interesting and critical one, 
performing  an  intermediary  function  or  facilitator  role  in  relations  between  Northeast 
Asian countries. This is especially the case with APT. Although the PRC, Japan, and 
Korea have recently initiated trilateral summit, ministerial, and other types of meetings, 
many aspects of their relations at the bilateral and sub-regional level remain notably 
problematic. All three nations have sought closer and more comprehensive economic 
and security relations with ASEAN as strategically important elements of their respective 
regional foreign policies, each signing free trade agreements with Southeast Asia, as 
well as becoming signatories to ASEAN‘s Treaty of Amity. While ASEAN has limited 
geopolitical  and  geo-economic  weight,  it  has  become  a  vital  fulcrum  of  East  Asia‘s 
regional affairs. The taxi driver analogy is sometimes used to explain the relationship: 
ASEAN  is  in  the  driving  seat  and  facilitates  the  ride  but  the  taxi‘s  Northeast  Asian 
passengers have significant influence over the ultimate direction the vehicle takes. As 
East Asia‘s longest standing regional organization, ASEAN‘s own regional agenda and 
programs have useful demonstration effects for APT and EAS. Southeast Asia‘s current 
plans  to  create  three  inter-locking  regional  economic,  security,  and  socio-cultural 
communities by 2015 could show East Asia a future path to take after any regional free 
trade or basic regional security agreement is implemented. This is another aspect of 
ASEAN‘s  role  as  an  intermediary  facilitator  of  regional  integration  in  East  Asia. 
Furthermore,  and as its name clearly indicates, the APT arrangement—ASEAN Plus 
Three—is  essentially  a  spin-off  of  ASEAN‘s  regional  diplomacy.  Similarly,  the  EAS 
derived from APT diplomacy, specifically the decision to hold the first East Asia Summit 
which was taken at the 2000 APT Summit.  
 
Instruments and Ideologies 
 
Given  that  East  Asian  countries  are  core  to  many  important  regional  institutional 
arrangements in Asia and the Asia–Pacific, there remains much debate concerning into 
which  arrangement  they  will  make  the  most  important  diplomatic  and  strategic 
investments in coming years, and therefore which one is most likely to prevail as the 
region‘s  premier  regional  institution.  Certain  parallels  can  be  drawn  here  with  the 
European experience of the 1960s, when Western Europe was broadly divided into the 
European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  and  the  European  Free  Trade  Association 
(EFTA)  groupings.  It  was  the  EEC  that  eventually  became  predominant,  primarily 
because it developed the more substantive and successful instruments for advancing 
regional co-operation and integration that in turn conferred the organization with greater 
leverage on the international stage. Applying the same principles to East Asia in the 
early 21
st century, it is likely to be the regional framework or organization that develops 
the most useful instruments and mechanisms for regional co-operation and integration 
that  will  become  predominant  in  the  region.  At  present,  APT  has  developed  a  clear 
advantage over the EAS in this respect, but this may still change. It will largely depend 
on  whether the latter  can deliver  more than just summit-level declarations that state 
aspirational  objectives  on  regional  co-operation  without  putting  in  place  substantive  
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instruments to realize them. Failing to move beyond this position will attract growing 
criticism, as ASEM has experienced, despite its stated low-level ambition to remain an 
inter-regional  dialogue  forum.  Meanwhile,  APEC  has  developed  a  number  of 
instruments, but many of its most important ones, such as IAPs, have proved to be 
somewhat blunt. 
 
Countries will also choose into which regional institution to make the most diplomatic 
and  strategic  investments  depending  on  ideological,  development,  and  geopolitical 
factors. It has been argued that East Asian countries are more likely to invest in APT (or 
EAS)  over  APEC  because  the  former  is  focused  more  on  financial,  economic,  and 
technical co-operation, while the latter has prioritized commercial liberalization and neo-
liberal-oriented regulatory (i.e., structural) reform. Hence, APT is more aligned with East 
Asia‘s underlying development interests and developmentalist ideologies than APEC, 
whose agenda remains notably influenced by the market-liberal ideologies of Anglo–
Pacific  countries,  particularly  the  US.  If  APEC  had  bestowed  greater  priority  to  its 
ecotech  agenda,  then  East  Asian  countries  would  perhaps  have  made  greater 
institutional investments in the organization. 
 
A Future Regional Institutional Architecture for the Wider East Asia Region 
 
So what do the above points suggest concerning the future development of regional 
institutional  architecture  in  the  wider  East  Asian  region?  To  start,  the  creation  of  a 
stronger regional institutional architecture helps realize the following inter-related goals: 
 
(i)  To foster more harmonious relations between the peoples of the region 
concerned, and engender a deeper and more coherent sense of regional 
community amongst the region‘s peoples; 
(ii)  To  more  effectively  address  the  economic,  political,  socio-cultural, 
environmental, and security challenges facing the region‘s peoples as a 
whole; 
(iii)  To  close  development-divide  gaps  in  the  region  to  ensure  that  all  the 
region‘s  peoples  are  sufficiently  empowered  to  both  participate  in  and 
benefit from regional community building processes; and 
(iv)  To contribute to broader global community building endeavors and the 
strengthening  of  global  governance  structures;  in  this  sense,  stronger 
regional societies provide a firmer foundation on which to build a stronger 
global society. 
Figure  5  presents  a  possible  formulation  for  a  future  East  Asian-centered  regional 
institutional architecture. At the integrative center is APT, with ASEAN working as an 
intermediary  facilitator  along  the  lines  suggested  earlier.  For  example,  the  ASEAN 
Economic Community initiative might provide some kind of pathway for APT to follow in 
the future  on  developing  an  East  Asian  common  market. Of  the  six  regional  bodies 
studied  in  this  paper,  APT  is  the  most  viable  grouping  on  which  to  achieve  deeper 
regional  economic  integration  involving  East  Asian  countries  based  on  two 
fundamentally  important  principles.  The  first  is  that  APT  has  the  highest  levels  of 
regional economic coherence of all six regional groupings, and thus the firmest basis of 
existing regionalized linkages on which to build deeper integration. Moreover, APT does  
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not have as disparate a range of political economic philosophies as the EAS group, 
which confers a relative advantage to the former when negotiating deeper integration. 
This  point  is  linked  also  to  the  second  principle,  which  is  that  regional  groups  with 
smaller memberships tend to have a smaller range of national interests to reconcile and 
are therefore better able to secure a basis for collective action on regional integration 
that  requires  deeper  policy-related  commitments  than  regional  co-operation.  While 
economists may argue that, for example, larger free trade areas generally yield larger 
trade creation gains, the reality is that larger agreements are more politically difficult to 
achieve,  as  APEC‘s  experience  with  the  FTAAP  and  the  American  hemisphere 
countries‘ experience of trying to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas have also 
demonstrated.  Thus,  the  APT-based  EAFTA  has  advantages  over  the  EAS-based 
CEPEA  for  this  reason.  APT  has  already  made  progress  on  regional  financial  co-
operation  and  integration,  and  its  core  function  should  remain  regional  economic 
integration, while expanding more deeply into other areas outlined in Figure 5.  
 
As Figure 5 indicates, APT is embedded within an EAS regional framework whose core 
function is to facilitate dialogue between its member countries, and possibly the wider 
East Asian region‘s principal stakeholders, such as the US, to discuss a range of key 
issues and challenges facing the wider East Asia community. This would help establish 
a much clearer division of labor between APT and EAS, and Japan‘s recent proposal for 
creating an East Asian Community (EAC) can be the basis for this reformulated and 
rebranded  EAS.  By  helping  foster  more  harmonious  relations  amongst  East  Asian 
nations through more focused dialogue and consultation on key regional issues, the EAS 
(or  EAC)  can  make  important  contributions  to  APT‘s  work  on  regional  economic 
integration. For example, the EAS dialogue on new security issues would connect with 
discussions  on  how  these  might  be  incorporated  into  an  APT-based  regional  trade 
agreement, e.g. its provision on environment, energy, and labor mobility.  
 
In  turn,  the  core  functions  of  larger  inter-regional  and  trans-regional  groupings,  as 
represented  by  ASEM  and  APEC,  would  be  two-fold.  The  first  is  concerned  with 
advancing  region  based  co-operation,  dialogue,  and  norm-setting  amongst  its 
memberships in their specialist functional areas. ASEM already works on the general 
region-based principle of bringing together Asia and Europe into a closer inter-regional 
partnership.  This  could  over  time  be  applied  to  APEC,  depending  on  whether  an 
increasingly coherent East Asian region would be able to act on a collective basis in 
certain areas of co-operation. As previously noted, APEC has achieved some success at 
fostering a co-operation culture, promoting the socialization of key decision makers in 
the Asia–Pacific, and strengthening norms of co-operation in the trans-region. This work 
should be valued, as should the mass of small-scale regional co-operation initiatives and 
projects that both APEC and ASEM have developed in recent years. For inter-regional 
and trans-regional groupings of this size and diversity, perhaps neither APEC nor ASEM 
should be expected to achieve too much in terms of regional co-operation, and certainly 
not  with  respect  to  regional  integration  agreements.  The  FTAAP  is  too  ambitious  a 
project and risks undermining APEC‘s credibility still further by becoming yet another 
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Figure 5:  Future Possible Regional Institutional Architecture for the Wider        
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Although APEC could expand its agenda to more firmly address new security issues, 
there  is  a  risk  of  it  increasingly  competing  with  the  EAS  or  its  reformulated  EAC 
equivalent in this regard, especially if EAS membership expands to include the US and 
other  APEC  members.  It  could,  therefore,  be  better  for  APEC  to  remain  focused on 
regional economic issues, especially in relation to interfaces between the Asia–Pacific 
economy and global economic governance. This leads to the second core function of 
APEC  and  ASEM:  developing  their  potential  for  multilateral  utility  by  making  more 
fervent  contributions  to  the  strengthening  of  global  governance  structures  and  more 
effectively addressing key global issues of the early 21
st century. APEC already has a 
history  of  exercising  multilateral  utility,  including  the  WTO‘s  Information  Technology 
Agreement that was derived at least partly out of APEC trade diplomacy initiatives (Dent 
2004). Both APEC and ASEM account for half of the G20 membership by different but 
overlapping configurations, and also account for very large shares of the global economy 
and  population.  They  represent  very  significant  constituencies  in  an  emerging  global 
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society and this fact needs to be more seriously acknowledged. Of course, exercises of 
multilateral utility would depend on the ability of APEC and ASEM to form a consensus 
among their respective membership or agree upon collective actions on how to best 
address key global issues (e.g., climate change), both of which may be very difficult to 
achieve.  However,  at  least  focusing  more  on  developing  multilateral  utility  functions 
would provide some much needed impetus for both APEC and ASEM. 
 
This suggested configuration of an East Asia-centered regional institutional architecture 
is  based  on  the  principle  of  functional  specialization.  It  is  not  being  suggested  that 
distinct demarcations be drawn between regional institutions in the functional division of 
labor, rather that more would be achieved if such specialization occurs. At present, there 
is much duplication of effort in similar functional areas (e.g., on regional FTAs) and what 
may be referred to as diffuse regionalism in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific, which is the 
presence  of  many  competing  yet  similar  ideas  of  (i)  what  type  of  core  regional 
community should be formed, (ii) which direction (or directions) it should be heading, and 
(iii) what activities and issues should be the basis of regional community actions. Diffuse 
regionalism is largely the consequence of a number of countries looking to champion 
their own vision of (and interests in) the region, with each of these countries—Japan and 
EAS, the PRC and APT, Australia and APC, the US and APEC—not being prepared to 
back down.  
 
The Crucially Important Sino-Japanese Relationship 
 
The  Sino–Japanese  relationship  will  shape  the  future  development  of  East  Asia‘s 
regional institutions and community building perhaps more than any other factor. Japan 
and the PRC‘s contrasting positions on EAS membership are indicative of their rivalry 
concerning various matters of East Asian regional leadership. At the 2009 APT and EAS 
summits,  it  was  still  clear  that  Japan  favored  an  EAS-based  regional  grouping  and 
initiatives  (e.g.,  CEPEA,  EAC),  while  the  PRC  preferred  APT-based  (e.g.,  EAFTA) 
regional community building.
55 The PRC is the ascendant power, but Japan will for some 
time remain sufficiently powerful to cancel out bids the PRC makes for supreme regional 
hegemony. The PRC, of course, has the capacity to return the favor. The persistence of 
this regional hegemonic rivalry is, however, ultimately counter-productive to East Asia‘s 
interests and will significantly hinder future regional community and regional institutional 
building. Japan and the PRC are nevertheless working together co-operatively at various 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, and the degree of their economic (and other 
forms of) interdependence has deepened substantially in recent  years (Dent 2008b). 
Developing a stronger Sino–Japanese partnership is crucial to the future institutional 
development of both APT and EAS, as well as other East Asian regional bodies. The 
PRC and Japan will continue to dominate the region for the foreseeable future as they 
together account for around 80% of East Asia‘s GDP, even if India becomes a more 
integral part of East Asian affairs.  
 
More generally, great power geopolitics will also significantly determine the future path 
and  configuration  of  regional  institutions  involving  East  Asian  countries.  If  India 
continues to develop closer economic, political, and security relations with the East Asia 
                                                           
55 Xinhua News, Japan Times. 24 October 2009.  
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region, then this would strengthen its claim for regional membership on various fronts. It 
is already a member of the EAS and ASEM, and could well accede to APEC in the not-
too-distant future. The influence of the US will continue to loom large, shaping many 
bilateral  and  multilateral  contexts  in  which  East  Asian  regional  institution  building 
processes occur. Russia‘s growing energy relations with the PRC, Japan, Korea and 
other  East  Asian  states  could  also  prove  a  significant  factor.  In  sum,  great  power 
geopolitics is currently pushing and pulling East Asia‘s regional community and regional 
institution building in a number of directions, many of these competing to some extent 
with each other. Overall, a stronger Sino–Japanese partnership would help steer these 
twin processes more than any other factor towards less turbulent waters. A rationalized 
division of labor amongst the regional institutions studied in this paper, along the lines 
suggested above, is also required to achieve these ends. 
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